



Beyond “Christian nationalism”:

Measuring attitudes to Christianity
and Britishness today

Dr Nick Spencer and Dr Yinxuan Huang





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
“Christian nationalism” is apparently growing in the UK but, although much used, the phrase is often vague and can be unhelpful.

We commissioned and analysed research into the perceived (and desired) relationship between Christianity and Britishness among 1,765 UK adults.

8% of UK adults strongly agree that you need to be Christian to be truly British, and 9% slightly agree. Only 1% thinks that being Christian is the most important factor for being truly British.

Beneath these headline figures, UK public opinion shows a more complex understanding of the perceived and desired relationship between Christianity and Britishness, in which different kinds of nationalism and different approaches to Christianity inform opinion.

Our analysis revealed five distinct groups or positions, split between (what we have termed):



Committed Separatists don't want Christianity to be part of Britishness but don't have a particularly strong sense of British national identity anyway.

Cultural Separatists don’t want Christianity to be part of Britishness but are hostile to the idea that any other cultural or religious identity – most obviously Islam or immigrant identities – should occupy that space.

Values Integrationists do not think you need to be Christian to be British, but they do see Christianity as an important element of British values and want to see that recognised and protected.

Identity Integrationists see Christianity as fundamental to Britishness and want to defend the nation’s Christian heritage from what they see as invasive and threatening influences.

Belief Integrationists want to see Christianity integrated with Britishness but, for the most part, because they want to promote the Christian faith rather than preserve Christian values.

About the project

This report is part of a wider research project exploring the rise of Christian nationalism in UK and Europe. It is led by Nick Spencer and undertaken by Yinxuan Huang, George Lapshynov, Hannah Rich, Nathan Mladin, and Coco Huggins. It is funded by The Ideas Workshop which is part of Open Society Foundations.



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Executive Summary



“Christian nationalism” is a popular, but not necessarily helpful term when trying to understand the range of views people have about the proper relationship between Christianity and Britishness today.

Because “Christian” can mean different things (believing, practising, ethical, identitarian, nominal, etc.)¹ and because there are different dimensions to nationalism (constitutional, legal, political, ethnic, natal, civic, cultural, historical, etc.)², we need greater nuance when it comes to understanding how the public views Christianity and the nation – or, more precisely, what range of different views the public holds on this subject.

Through quantitative research in the UK (and five other European countries), along with Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and Latent Class Analysis (LCA) (see below for more details on these), we identified five distinct groups or classes among the UK adult population when it comes to Christianity and Britishness. We have called these:

- Committed Separatists (34% of our sample)
- Cultural Separatists (16%)
- Values Integrationists (26%)
- Identity Integrationists (11%)
- Belief Integrationists (13%)

There are some differences between these groups on demographic, regional, and socio-economic grounds, but no group is obviously the preserve of men/women, older/ younger, rich/ poor, etc. Their key differences are primarily attitudinal, creedal and, to a degree, behavioural. A summary of their key features is below.

The two ‘separatist’ groups

These two groups believe Christianity should be kept separate from British national identity, though for different reasons and to different extents.

Committed Separatists are largely non-religious, and slightly more likely to be female, younger, better educated, and higher social class. They don’t think Christianity has anything to do with Britishness and believe firmly the two should be kept separate. They are relaxed about immigration, Islam and a changing Britain, but tend not to feel particularly strongly about national loyalty in the first place.

Cultural Separatists are equally non-religious, and have a similar demographic profile to Committed Separatists but are a bit more likely to be middle-aged and lower socio-economic status. They share separatist views (although without the intensity of Committed Separatists) but while they don’t want Britain to be Christian, they are extremely hostile to the idea of churches becoming mosques (whereas Committed Separatists don’t really care). They are more attached to the nation than Committed Separatists, cherishing things like “our national history” and “national ceremonial occasions and symbols”. They are less happy (than Committed Separatists) about asylum and immigration, less happy about Britain’s ethnic and cultural mix, and less happy about Islam.

The three ‘integrationist’ groups

These three groups believe Christianity should be integrated into British national identity, but in different ways, to different degrees, and for different reasons.

Values Integrationists are slightly older than average, and slightly more likely to be sympathetic to parties on the right. They are highly likely to call themselves Christian but are not especially likely to be practising. They see Christianity as a value-based phenomenon, which has pervaded Britain’s history, culture and institutions, done it good and is worth protecting and preserving.

Identity Integrationists are more likely to be older, C2DE, and white.³ They are the most likely of all groups to support Reform. They have a very rich (or ‘thick’: see later) idea of national identity and are very concerned about the state of the nation, with particular hostility to immigration, asylum and Islam. They are deeply committed to the *identity* of Christianity, which they see as being about creed, culture and heritage, but this commitment doesn’t translate into similarly high levels of practice (they are the most ‘nominal Christian’ of all groups). They come closest to the view that you need to be Christian to be truly British and, in as far as any group merits the label ‘Christian nationalist’, it is this one.

Belief Integrationists are more likely to be male, Millennial, and non-white. They show the highest level of practising Christianity of all groups. They want to see Christianity and Britishness closely integrated but more to promote Christianity than preserve it. They have a slightly more traditional moral orientation than other Integrationists, but are also inclined away from democratic and deliberative politics. They show high levels of belief in the Great Replacement Theory (the idea that “the white population in Europe is deliberately being replaced by migrants from Muslim countries”).

Mapping the five groups

When these five groups are mapped together (chapter 2) a number of conclusions emerge:

- Attitudes to Christianity and Britishness are not just a function of people’s Christian beliefs. It is not simply the case that you can predict someone’s views on these matters on the basis of their Christianity (or lack thereof).
- Attitudes to Christianity and Britishness are part – in some ways a subset – of wider attitudes to the significance and ‘thickness’ of national identity generally. To understand “Christian nationalism”, it is important to understand nationalism first. Thus:
 - Committed Separatists look like Internationalists, with a limited attachment to the nation
 - Cultural Separatists look like nationalists but with a slightly ambivalent attitude to the nation they want to protect
 - Values Integrationists look like generic patriots, largely untouched by the passions of this debate
 - Identity Integrationists look like nationalists whose nationalism is fortified by an attachment to Christianity
 - Belief Integrationists look like Christians whose Christianity moves them towards a form of nationalism

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Introduction

When, in September 2025, upwards of 150,000 people marched through London on a Unite the Kingdom rally, a surprising number of them were carrying crosses. Others held placards with Christian messages and symbols. Ordained ministers spoke from the stage, and a worship band played songs to a sometimes bemused, sometimes enthusiastic audience. The afternoon had moments of a revivalist meeting about it.

This sense of a strange new union between Christianity and British national identity was strengthened by other stories. Tommy Robinson, who had organised the rally, had been released from prison earlier in the summer, wearing a wooden necklace cross. Thousands of St George’s flags and Union Jacks appeared on lampposts and public buildings across the country seemingly overnight. The prominent Christian Tory MP Danny Kruger delivered a speech to an empty House of Commons on how Christianity was the foundation of British democracy, liberty and culture, which was watched on X (according to X stats) 3.9 million times. Kruger later defected to Reform UK, where he was joined by conservative philosopher and Christian, James Orr, first as Senior Adviser to Nigel Farage, then as Head of Policy, before he stepped down following an undercover investigation by Verbatim into donations to Reform UK. Smaller, hard right parties like, Restore, UKIP and Advance UK were leaning into a Christian identitarian narrative. Unite the Kingdom returned to Whitehall in December with a (much less well attended) carol concert, and again in May 2026 for another rally with distinct Christian content. In September 2026, black-clad agitators descended on Dover and Portsmouth, many chanting “Christ is King” to protest against, and to prevent, refugees and migrants arriving on small boats. In a relatively short period of

time, Christianity and nationalism (or patriotism – the terms are much debated) were being fused together in the public mind.

Unused to such public – and unapologetically patriotic/ nationalistic – demonstrations of Christianity, the commentariat went into overdrive, attempting to explain what this phenomenon was, where it had come from, and why it was happening here and now. In doing so, they reached for the label of “Christian nationalism”.

There was not, however, much agreement on what exactly “Christian nationalism” entailed, or even whether it was a meaningful term at all. Various descriptions and definitions associated it with white supremacy, nativism, patriarchy, authoritarianism, conservatism, fundamentalism, theocracy, misogyny, and pretty much anything that was opposed to a liberal secular worldview.⁴ Accordingly, Christian nationalism is, according to Humanists UK, “an ultra-conservative” movement, which wants “the government to promote... religious interests”; and is opposed to “the separation of church and state”, “learning about other beliefs and cultures”, and “people having choice at the end of life.”⁵

Small wonder that Luke Bretherton, Regius Professor of Moral & Pastoral Theology at Oxford, told the Church of England Bishops that “Christian nationalism functions less as a robust analytical category than as a misdiagnosis”, and “as a mode of labelling and stigmatisation” (or conversely as “a badge of honour by those it was intended to condemn”), and that it should never be used when “talking on behalf of the Church in the context of public witness”.⁶

On measuring “Christian nationalism”

In reality, in spite of the breadth and vagueness with which the term is used, it is possible to bring *some* clarity to the idea of “Christian nationalism”. Whether people use the phrase clearly is another matter altogether. We have argued (here⁷) that it should be understood as the belief that those two constituent terms – “Christianity” and “the nation” – are somehow coterminous or co-dependent. They occupy the same boundaries or space. In effect (the logic runs), because Britain (or America or...) is a Christian nation, to be truly British (or American...) you need, therefore, to be Christian.

If that’s so, it is, in theory, quite straightforward to measure the extent of “Christian nationalism” in a country: simply ask the public how far they agree that to be truly British (or American, etc) you should be Christian. We have done that of people in the UK (as well as France, Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Romania) and found that in the UK 8% of adults strongly agree and a further 9% slightly agree. (See here⁸ for more details). So far, so straightforward.

It would be hasty and misleading to conclude here, however. The terms “British” and “Christian” are themselves open to different interpretations. When people are thinking about being British, are they thinking about constitutional, legal, political, cultural, racial, or historical dimensions of Britishness? Is Britishness defined by who is the head of state, what kind of laws are passed, what cultural institutions are cherished, or which people live here?

Similarly, when people are thinking about being Christian, are they thinking about belief, practice, ethics, identity, values, or something else? Is a Christian someone who attends church, believes

that Jesus Christ is their personal saviour, holds Christian values, or calls themselves Christian – or some combination of these? “To be truly British (or American, etc) you need to be Christian” is a simple statement but, on closer inspection, it is bedevilled by complexities. In short, in order to measure Christian nationalism, you need to do more than ask that single question.

This is what some researchers have already done. Because this phenomenon (whatever it is) is more established and more prevalent in the US, it is also better studied there. In their widely referenced book on the topic, *Taking America back for God*, Andrew Whitehead and Samuel Perry drew on respondents’ answers to six statements concerning the relationship between religion and nation/ state (the two concepts are often used interchangeably in this debate) to measure the phenomenon.⁹ These were:

1. The federal government should declare the United States a Christian nation.
2. The federal government should advocate Christian values.
3. The federal government should enforce strict separation of church and state.¹⁰
4. The federal government should allow the display of religious symbols in public spaces.
5. The success of the United States is part of God’s plan.
6. The federal government should allow prayer in public schools.

Combining respondents’ scores, they produced a linear scale that then allowed them to draw out four categories of Christian nationalist, ranging from those (“Rejecters”) who were not Christian nationalist, indeed were strongly opposed to all forms of Christian nationalism,

through “Resisters” and “Accommodators”, to “Ambassadors” at the other end who were thoroughly in favour of it.

This is a promising approach, albeit one that implicitly shows how different the phenomenon of Christian nationalism is between countries. Not only would none of those statements be directly transferable to the European context, some would be conceptually meaningless: there is no formal separation between church and state in the UK, nor strict guidelines on the display of religious symbols in public spaces, as there are in the USA. That recognised, the different ways in which the co-dependency of “Christianity” and “the nation” are tested in this example is instructive.

Because the subject is so understudied in the UK (and indeed continental Europe), there are (to the best of our knowledge) no comparable studies. However, some academic research is relevant. In a paper examining the relationship between Christianity and national identity (published in 2011, so long before – and therefore unburdened by – the phrase “Christian nationalism”), Ingrid Storm drew on the 2008 British Social Attitudes survey to tease apart how different kinds of nationalism related to different kinds of Christianity.¹¹ Storm pointed out that nationalism could take various forms (she identified civic-symbolic, cultural-aesthetic, and ethnic) as could religious identity (active participation in a religious community, private faith, purely nominal affiliation, etc.) She also pointed out that the relationship between religious and national identity is further complicated by the multi-nationality of UK, a topic to which we shall return.

Storm pointed out that religion and national identity could have importantly different relationships. Both are “imagined communities”,

to use Benedict Anderson’s famous phrase, drawing on symbols, stories, myths, rituals, etc. to bind a people together. In that way, they can pull apart (religious identity and national loyalty undermining one another¹²) or pull together (religious narratives legitimising national ones, and vice versa).¹³

Storm measured how far Christianity played into this more complex relationship in contemporary Britain and found that “civic-symbolic national identity and cultural-aesthetic national identity increase sharply with both Christian affiliation and attendance”.¹⁴ In contrast, “ethnic national identity was highest among those who are only nominally or passively religious and decreases with increased religious involvement.”¹⁵

What this in effect meant was that “receptivity to national public symbols such as the national anthem, sports teams and ceremonial occasions” (what Storm calls “civic-symbolic” nationalism) and “feeling more national when being in or seeing the countryside or experiencing national art, music or poetry” (what she calls “cultural-aesthetic” nationalism) are both positively correlated to active Christian faith. In contrast, “thinking that immigrants are a threat to the national identity and that non-whites cannot be English, Scottish or Welsh” (i.e. “ethnic nationalism”) is more correlated with identitarian Christianity. In her conclusion, “many of the nominal Christians do appear to be... ‘ethnic nominalists’, that is they identify with the church or Christianity in order to signal their identity as ‘white British’, and to distance themselves from minority faiths.”¹⁶

Storm’s paper is interesting and valuable and encouraging to those who would like to claim that the more exclusionary parts of Christian nationalism are really just the provenance of nominal Christians.

However, being published in 2011 and drawing on BSA data collected in 2008, her work is also dated. Much has happened in the last 20 years that might change this picture – not least the emergence in the UK of something called “Christian nationalism”.

That acknowledged, this work, alongside Whitehead and Perry’s more recent study (albeit that also draws on surveys that are now ten years old) underline the importance of bringing nuance to the measurement of Christian nationalism and moving away from the dichotomous implications of the phrase – some people are Christian nationalists; others aren’t – into something more complex. Or, to borrow, Luke Bretherton’s words, it encourages us “to expose the limits of a framework that flattens complex transnational religious and political dynamics into a single explanatory label.”

How we measured “Christian nationalism”

Theos commissioned an independent market research agency RED C to conduct research into public attitudes towards Christianity and nationhood, alongside a whole range of attendant topics such as immigration, ethnicity, Islam, politics, and current affairs. The survey interviewed 10,848 adults (18+) in six countries (UK, Romania, Germany, France, Poland, and Hungary), between 7 and 27 April 2026, with quotas applied for age, gender, region, social grade, and income. The UK sample was 1,765. Full details of the survey methodology, panel integrity and data quality can be found here, with the full questionnaire available here. (see www.theosthinktank.co.uk for more details)

After the data were cleaned and delivered, we conducted a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) on them, as a preliminary diagnostic step before moving on to a Latent Class Analysis (LCA) that enabled us to identify groups within the general public according to their different attitudes to the topic in hand. All percentages reported in the main analysis are weighted using the UK population weight and should be treated as weighted estimates rather than exact population figures. Full technical details of this work can be found on the Theos website, but in essence this process involved three steps.

What are PCA and LCA, and why did we use them?

Empirically, Christian nationalism is what social scientists call a latent construct: an underlying orientation that we seek to understand through a range of observable survey items. Our analysis therefore needed to do two things. At the outset, we used Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to examine the relationships between a wider pool of candidate items and reduce them to a smaller, coherent set of indicators that together best captured the underlying construct of Christian nationalism. Then cut, we used Latent Class Analysis (LCA) to examine how people responded across this set of indicators. LCA is designed to uncover such structures from patterns in observed data.

Importantly, rather than placing respondents on a single scale from ‘less’ to ‘more’ Christian nationalist, it identifies qualitatively different types or classes of response. This was particularly appropriate for our understanding of Christian nationalism as a multidimensional concept, in which people may combine attitudes towards Christianity, nationhood, identity, or culture in different ways.

Taken together, PCA helped us identify the indicators with the strongest empirical relevance to Christian nationalism as a latent construct, while LCA helped us identify the various patterns of response that underpin different forms of Christian nationalism among people. In practice, we translated this methodological rationale into a staged process of item selection, testing and classification.

First, we identified 16 questions/ statements from the survey that could be used to develop a nuanced understanding of the public’s differing attitudes to Christianity and the nation.

Second, these questions/ statements were tested in the Principal Component Analysis, which found that 13 had sufficient explanatory power to be included in subsequent analysis. These were:

Item	Possible Responses
The local church closes and is turned into a mosque	Very happy/ Quite happy/ No feelings either way/ Quite unhappy/ Very unhappy
The decline of Christianity	Very concerned/ Concerned/ Slightly concerned/ Not at all concerned
To be truly British you should be a Christian	Strongly agree/ Slightly agree/ Neither agree nor disagree/ Slightly disagree/ Strongly disagree
It is important for the political leader of my country to be a Christian	Strongly agree/ Slightly agree/ Neither agree nor disagree/ Slightly disagree/ Strongly disagree
The government should formally state that Britain is a Christian country	Strongly agree/ Slightly agree/ Neither agree nor disagree/ Slightly disagree/ Strongly disagree
I believe that God has got a special plan for Britain	Strongly agree/ Slightly agree/ Neither agree nor disagree/ Slightly disagree/ Strongly disagree
The law in Britain should be based on Christian values	Strongly agree/ Slightly agree/ Neither agree nor disagree/ Slightly disagree/ Strongly disagree
People who do not hold Christian values do not belong in Britain	Strongly agree/ Slightly agree/ Neither agree nor disagree/ Slightly disagree/ Strongly disagree
Religious education in Britain should prioritise the teaching of Christianity	Strongly agree/ Slightly agree/ Neither agree nor disagree/ Slightly disagree/ Strongly disagree

Item	Possible Responses
Christianity should continue to play an important role in shaping national identity	Strongly agree/ Slightly agree/ Neither agree nor disagree/ Slightly disagree/ Strongly disagree
Christian values require that we welcome and support asylum seekers	Strongly agree/ Slightly agree/ Neither agree nor disagree/ Slightly disagree/ Strongly disagree
Defending our Christian heritage and culture	Which of these factors do you think are important to being a Christian?
Trying to make sure our country stays Christian	Which of these factors do you think are important to being a Christian?

These 13 statements were chosen because the PCA model found they had greatest explanatory power. Happily, they also covered a range of different factors such as constitutional, political, legal, ethical, theological, and cultural relationship between Christianity and Britain.

It is worth noting that the questions were about *Britain*. This was decided after much discussion, and primarily on the grounds of manageability. It is highly likely that asking the same questions about England/ Englishness would have elicited different responses. But asking about Englishness at very least implies that we should also ask about Scottishness (and possibly also Welsh and Irish identities), which itself would have resulted in different answers, Scottish nationalism being a different beast to English and British nationalism. The unwieldiness of this, plus the fact the language of Britain/ the United Kingdom (UTK) is highly prevalent in this debate – Unite *the Kingdom*, Restore *Britain*, UKIP, *Britain First* – and that there was a clear emphasis on the four nations of Britain during the May UTK rally, led us to conclude that, for all the problems that came with it, we would be best to be measuring attitudes to *Britain*.

Thirdly, once these 13 statements were identified, they were then used to detect distinct types of Christian nationalist “orientation” among UK respondents – bearing in mind here that “Christian nationalist orientation” means not different kinds of Christian nationalism but also those positions that are orientated completely away from Christian nationalism (in the same way as Whitehead and Perry’s analysis of Christian nationalism in the US included “Rejecters”).

In essence, the 13 questions/ statements capture different ways in which Christian elements may be incorporated into thinking about the nation (law, culture, politics, etc.), and LCA then examines how responses to these items cluster together amongst people in the wider population, thereby revealing broader patterns that no single question can identify on its own.

Although the consequent result still requires a degree of judgement, in particular as to whether three, four, five, six or even more groups provides the best explanation of the data, the results in this case strongly pointed towards a five-class solution, i.e. the most comprehensive but manageable description of British public’s attitude to the relationship between Christianity and the nation is served by identifying five classes or groups of people.

These five classes are named, identified and described in detail in the next chapter, with the one after that setting out various models and maps of how the different positions on this issue compare to one another.

6

1 Christianity and the nation: five different approaches

One basic way of measuring ‘Christian nationalism’ is to ask people whether they think you need to be Christian in order fully to belong to a nation. If Christian nationalism is about the coterminosity or co-dependency of those two entities, it stands to reason that to be British (or American, or whatever) you need *really* to be Christian too.

When we asked UK adults whether they agreed that “you need to be Christian to be truly British”, 8% of UK strongly agreed and 9% slightly agreed. When we pushed it and asked them what (from a list) they thought was the most important factor for being truly British, only 1% said they thought it was being a Christian.

There are other ways of getting at the same information. Do people who do not hold “Christian values” truly belong to the nation? (7% of UK adults strongly agreed they did not, 9% slightly agreed). Should the government formally state that Britain is a Christian country? Far more people (37%) agreed that it should, but is that because this is a much softer statement than saying that you need to be Christian to be truly British?

Depending on how you ask the question – how demanding your criteria – you can therefore get figures of anywhere between 1% to upwards of 20% for the “Christian nationalism” constituency, with the most credible numbers hovering around 10%.

But unless every single practising Christian holds these views – an improbable scenario – something strange is going on, because the entire practising Christian population in the UK is not far from 10%. Presumably, these views are held by people who don’t go to church, just as we know many churchgoers don’t hold these views. In other words, there is an unexamined dimension of *what Christianity means* within this debate.

In a similar way, the concept of Britishness covers a multitude of possibilities. If only 1% agree that being Christian is the most important element for being British, what do the other 99% think? The answer – or at least the top three answers – is “to be committed to democracy and freedom of speech” (15%), “to have been born here” (14%), and “to be able to speak English” (13%). In other words, just as there are various ways of understanding Christianity, there are various ways of understanding Britishness in this debate.

For that reason, rather than leave it at “the Christian nationalist constituency is about 10%, give or take”, our research used a wide range of data to bring detail to the question not simply of how big is Christian nationalism in the UK, but what do the British people think about the relationship between Christianity and Britishness today?

Our analysis of the data drew out five distinct groups, the characteristics of which are outlined in this chapter. How they relate to one another and can be mapped in conceptual space is discussed in the following chapter.

Group 1: Committed Separatists (34%)



The largest class group identified by the model represents just over a third of the UK population (34%) and is defined by a single consistent feature: their strong sense that Christianity should be kept separate from national arrangements, whether they be formal or informal, political or more loosely cultural. These people are “separatists” and they are committed to their separatism.

Predictably, this group strongly rejects any sense that Christianity is integral to Britishness (though they don’t necessarily do so for the same reasons). Four in five disagree that “to be truly British you should be a Christian”, and the same proportion disagree that “people who do not hold Christian values do not belong in Britain”. Three quarters disagree that “it is important for the political leader of my country to be a Christian”, and 68% disagree that “the government should formally state that Britain is a Christian country”. In each of these instances, the vast majority of those who disagree, do so strongly, and the vast majority of those who do not disagree, offer no opinion (i.e. neither agree or nor disagree). (Table 1. NB Here – and elsewhere – when figures do not add up to 100% it is because we have not included those respondents who answered ‘Don’t know’ or ‘Prefer not to answer’)¹⁷

Table 1: Committed Separatist view on “Christian nationalist” ideas

	Strongly agree	Slightly agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Slightly disagree	Strongly disagree
To be truly British you should be a Christian	0	2%	14%	11%	68%
People who do not hold Christian values do not belong in Britain	0	1%	12%	11%	71%
It is important for the political leader of my country to be a Christian	0	0	18%	16%	60%

Among this group, three quarters (74%) have no feelings either way if “the local church closes and is turned into a mosque” (indeed 11% would be quite or very happy at the prospect), and 71% are “not at all concerned about the decline of Christianity in Britain”.

There is a very slight softening of opinion in this group when it comes to whether “the law in Britain should be based on Christian values”, where 61% disagree (47% strongly) and 29% offer no opinion (“neither agree nor disagree”). Their views are broadly similar when it comes to the question of whether “religious education in Britain should prioritise the teaching of Christianity”, with 61% disagreeing (44% strongly), and also when it comes to the question of whether “Christianity should continue to play an important role in shaping national identity” (52% disagreeing, 36% strongly). (Table 2)

Table 2: Committed Separatist view on the role of Christianity in national life

	Strongly agree	Slightly agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Slightly disagree	Strongly disagree
The law in Britain should be based on Christian values	0	3%	29%	14%	47%
Religious education in Britain should prioritise the teaching of Christianity	0	1%	29%	17%	44%
Christianity should continue to play an important role in shaping national identity	1%	7%	32%	16%	36%

In short, **this group is defined and united, with considerable uniformity, by their rejection not simply of anything that might look like Christian nationalism but also of pretty much any form of Christian involvement in Britain’s political, legal, or social infrastructure.**

What else do we know about them? Demographically, this group is more likely than the sample average to be female, younger, better educated, and ABC1, though there is no noticeable difference on income, ethnicity or where they live. (See Appendix) Politically, they are more likely than other groups to feel an affiliation for, and to vote, Green (voting intention 23% vs. 12% in total sample).

Committed Separatists have a higher number of close friends compared to the other groups, but are not more (indeed are slightly less) likely to feel that there is a strong local community where they live, to which they are connected. This implies that they are more

likely to be well-connected but not necessarily well-rooted. They do, however, feel that the “local area is a place where people from different backgrounds get on well together” (64% strongly/ agree; 7% strongly/ disagree).

When it comes to religious belief, Committed Separatists are predictably more likely to say they have no religion (66% vs 46% of total sample), less likely to pray, and less likely to be baptised. But it is nonetheless worth noting that 23% do claim a Christian affiliation, 16% “definitely believe in God or some ‘higher power’”, 13% say that religion is either extremely or quite important to them, and 5% are weekly church attenders. It is a salutary reminder that **not all Separatists hold their views because they reject Christianity.**

Group 2: Cultural Separatists (16%)



The second group identified is much smaller than Committed Separatists but, in many ways, very similar to them. They are also Separatists, but of a different kind.

In many regards, their opinions on the relationship between Christianity and the nation/ state are identical. They hold similar views on similar issues, though generally with slightly weaker intensity. So, for example while 68% of Committed Separatists disagree strongly, and 11% disagree slightly, that you “need to be Christian to be truly British”, among the Cultural Separatists (Table 3), 50% disagree strongly and 22% slightly. In a similar vein, 71% of Committed Separatists disagree strongly, that “people who do not hold Christian values do not belong in Britain” and 11% disagree slightly, 51% of Cultural Separatists disagree strongly and 25% disagree slightly.

Table 3: Cultural Separatist view on the “Christian nationalist” ideas

	Strongly agree	Slightly agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Slightly disagree	Strongly disagree
To be truly British you should be a Christian	1%	3%	22%	22%	50%
People who do not hold Christian values do not belong in Britain	-	1%	20%	25%	51%

A similar pattern emerges with similar statements, such as whether the government should formally state that Britain is a Christian country, whether the law should be based on Christian values, whether it is important for the Prime Minister to be a Christian, or whether they are concerned about the decline of Christianity in

Britain. Time and again, Cultural Separatists exhibit separatist views but without the Committed Separatists’ energy.

Not surprisingly, this group is also consistently more likely to be non-committal on these subjects than are the Committed Separatists (or indeed the other three groups). For example, 44% of Cultural Separatists *neither agree nor disagree* that “religious education in Britain should prioritise the teaching of Christianity ahead of other faiths”, compared to 29% of Committed Separatists, and 26% of the overall population.

Indeed, when it comes to issues like whether the law in Britain should be based on Christian values, or whether Christianity “should continue to play an important role in shaping national identity” or whether the government “should formally state that Britain is a Christian country”, “neither agree nor disagree” is the most common answer from this group. (Table 4) **It’s not that they don’t want to separate Christianity from the nation: broadly speaking they do. It’s more that they don’t care about it with the committed passion of the Committed Separatists.**

Table 4: Cultural Separatist view on Christianity and national ideas

	Strongly agree	Slightly agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Slightly disagree	Strongly disagree
Religious education in Britain should prioritise the teaching of Christianity	2%	13%	44%	14%	22%
Christianity should continue to play an important role in shaping national identity	-	9%	42%	20%	25%
The government should formally state that Britain is a Christian country	1%	4%	35%	19%	35%

There is, however, one area (among the key LCA questions) in which this group is distinctly different from the Committed Separatists. When asked how happy they would be if the local church closed and turned into a mosque, the answers given by these two groups are radically different. (Table 5)

Table 5: How happy you would be if the local church closes and is turned into a mosque? Committed vs Cultural Separatists

How happy you would be if the local church closes and is turned into a mosque?	Committed Separatists	Cultural Separatists
Very happy	5%	-
Quite happy	6%	-
No feelings either way	74%	1%
Quite unhappy	-	50%
Very unhappy	-	49%

Whereas Committed Separatists are broadly indifferent about whether a church turns into a mosque, with a minority being pleased, the overwhelming majority – indeed 99% – of Cultural Separatists were either quite or very unhappy about it. This is a remarkable characteristic of a group that otherwise is somewhere between indifferent and hostile to the entanglement of Christianity with the nation and state.

One more among the key questions can help make sense of this important divergence and begin to make fuller sense of this group. One of the LCA questions was how far respondents agreed that “Christian values require that we welcome and support asylum seekers”. However much Committed Separatists rejected the idea that Christian institutions, beliefs, and ethics should have influence over the nation/ state, half (50%) of them agreed with this statement, and a further 28% had no opinion. Only 8% disagreed. (It is also worth noting at this point that when it comes to things that make you proud/ ashamed of your country, Committed Separatists are particularly ashamed of the way Britain treats immigrants and asylum seekers, exhibiting more shame and less pride on this issue than any other group.) In effect, **although Committed Separatists didn’t want Christianity in their nation, they still saw it as a welcoming and supportive influence when it came to asylum.** By comparison (Table 6), over a third (35%) of Cultural Separatists *disagreed* that “Christian values require that we welcome and support asylum seekers”, while only 28% agreed.

Table 6: “Christian values require that we welcome and support asylum seekers who arrive in Britain”: Committed vs Cultural Separatists

	Strongly agree	Slightly agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Slightly disagree	Strongly disagree
Committed Separatists	21%	29%	28%	5%	3%
Cultural Separatists	8%	20%	29%	17%	18%

One might hypothesise from this that the **Committed Separatists want to keep Christianity out of national politics in spite of the fact that it is a hospitable presence in asylum politics, whereas Cultural Separatists want to keep Christianity out of national politics because it is a hospitable presence in asylum politics.**

What other factors can we draw out to explain this group, and do they support this hypothesis? Cultural Separatists are not meaningfully different from the Committed Separatists in terms of gender, income, work status, and urban/ rural residence. (See Appendix) They are not quite as young as Committed Separatists (or indeed as the overall sample): less likely to be Gen Z and more likely to be middle-aged (Millennial or Gen X). They are also slightly lower socio-economic status, slightly less highly educated, and more likely to be white. They are somewhat less likely than Committed Separatists to vote Green (9% vs 23%) and somewhat more likely to vote Reform (20% vs 6%).

This group is also more likely than Committed Separatists to feel a bit unhappy about their immediate lot. They are more likely to say that there is no or limited community around them (58% vs 46% Committed Separatists), less likely to have a larger number of close friends, less likely to agree that their local area is a place where people

from different backgrounds get on well together, and more likely to say that they “feel lonely much of the time” (34% vs 24% Committed Separatists). They are also noticeably more likely to believe that Britain is in a state of moral decay (58% vs 37% of Committed Separatists). In other words, **Cultural Separatists are just a little more frustrated and disillusioned about their lives and immediate context.**

That context becomes clearer still when we examine their social views against those of the Committed Separatists. We need to be cautious here. For many of the factors discussed in following paragraphs, the other groups, to whom we shall turn, feel even stronger. But those groups are strongly *opposed* to separatist attitudes to Christianity and the nation. What is noteworthy is how two separatist-minded groups can differ so strongly on these issues.

First, it is worth noting that, in some regards Committed and Cultural Separatists share similar (religious) worldviews. (Table 7)

Table 7: Religious beliefs and attitudes (Committed vs Cultural Separatists)

	Committed Separatists	Cultural Separatists
Not religious / I don't have a religion / faith	66%	65%
Christian affiliation	23%	26%
Churchgoing (weekly attender)	5%	3%
Importance of religion (extremely or quite important)	13%	9%
I definitely believe in God or some 'higher power'	16%	15%
Pray (at least weekly)	14%	12%
Interested in the Bible	15%	11%
I believe that God has got a special plan for Britain (Net agree)	2%	4%

If anything, these data show **that Christianity is even less important to Cultural Separatists than it is to Committed Separatists.**

In addition to religious similarities, we can also see close similarities in certain attitudes and worldviews that are not directly related to Christianity. For example, they show similar levels of pride in Britain's “political values” (28% and 31% very/ quite proud), in our countryside (78% and 82% very/ quite proud), and are similarly unsympathetic to the idea that “the government should encourage women to have more children” (7% and 8% agreeing).

However, in other areas there is a marked difference. These are cultural areas, relating to what it means to live in and be part of Britain today. We can see this in attitudes to what it means to be British. For Committed Separatists, the top three in this list is:

1. “To be committed to democracy and freedom of speech” (chosen by 24% of Committed Separatists to be single the most important factor)
2. To obey the law (16%)
3. To live here (10%)

Cultural Separatists have a different list, but are also somewhat more divided, with 15% in each case choosing, “having been born here”, “being able to speak English”, and “being committed to democracy and freedom of speech”. Although not totally different (committed to democracy and freedom of speech appears in both lists), **Cultural Separatists lean towards a more natal/ cultural understanding of Britishness.**

It is a similar difference when it comes to what it means to be proud of Britain. Given a long list of factors relating to Britishness,¹⁸

Committed and Cultural Separatists are broadly in agreement. However, for three factors – ethnic, ceremonial/ symbolic, historical – that are highly salient to the cultural ideas of Britishness, there is a notable difference. (Table 8)

Table 8: Cultural ideas of Britishness (Committed vs Cultural Separatists)

	Committed Separatists	Cultural Separatists
Our national history (Very/ quite proud)	40%	63%
National ceremonial occasions and symbols, e.g. national anthem and flag (Very/ quite proud)	36%	58%
The fact that my country is predominantly white (Very/ quite proud)	6%	16%

The difference can be seen in the attitude to nationalism itself: 29% of Committed Separatists agree that “Nationalism is a virus”, compared to 15% of “Cultural Separatists”. The divergence comes out clearly in attitudes to Islam and Muslims (Table 9)...

Table 9: Attitudes to Islam (Committed vs Cultural Separatists)

	Committed Separatists	Cultural Separatists
Islam is completely compatible with British values (Net Agree)	36%	14%
Number of Muslims (expressing any level of concern)	18%	56%
Your local primary school's sex education curriculum changes due to pressure from Muslim parents (Net Unhappy)	47%	77%

...and in attitudes to asylum and immigration (Table 10)...

Table 10: Attitudes to asylum and immigration (Committed vs Cultural Separatists)

	Committed Separatists	Cultural Separatists
Temporary accommodation for asylum seekers being set up in your local area (Net Unhappy)	18%	62%
Immigration makes life harder for people already in this country (Net agree)	17%	62%
We need to send illegal migrants back to their own country (Net agree)	29%	70%

...and in attitudes to how Britain has changed and how ethnically and culturally mixed it is. (Table 11)

Table 11: Attitudes to ethnic and cultural mix in Britain (Committed vs Cultural Separatists)

	Committed Separatists	Cultural Separatists
I feel like a stranger in my own country (Net agree)	12%	34%
The local authority removes an old statue in your town because they consider it to be racist (Net Unhappy)	20%	56%
Britain is too ethnically mixed (Net agree)	7%	38%
We have lost traditional family values in Britain (net agree)	32%	62%

Overall, therefore, Committed and Cultural Separatists are one group in as far as they both reject the kinds of social, political and cultural arrangements that link Christianity, formally or informally, to Britishness. But they are very definitely two groups in as far as they hold this view for clearly different reasons.

Committed Separatists reject the entanglement on principled grounds, usually secular but occasionally religious, but are also inclined against any but the most civic forms of nationalism in any case. They don’t want Christianity to be part of the national picture, but they don’t have a particularly strong national picture anyway.

Cultural Separatists, by contrast, are no keener than Committed Separatists for Christian entanglement in matters of nationhood, but they are less intense in their views than their more committed counterparts. **Their view of the nation is more traditional, more settled, more natal, more cultural and in some instances more ethnic, and even though they don’t want Christianity to be part of that, they are hostile to the idea that any other cultural or religious identity – most obviously Islam or immigrant identities – should occupy that space.** It is a similar approach to that taken by other groups, as we shall see, only completely devoid of any Christian content.

The first two groups identified can be classed together on account of their unwillingness to see Christianity involved and implicated in Britishness. The remaining three groups, which happily also comprise 50% of the population, differ from one another in important regards but are united in wanting some kind of involvement or integration between Christianity and Britain. They are all, in effect, different kinds of “integrationist”.

Group 3: Values Integrationists (26%)



Values Integrationists comprise about a quarter of the population (roughly halfway between the size of the Committed Separatist and the Cultural Separatist groups) and are consistently negative about harder kinds of Christian nationalism. Less than one in ten of this group agrees that you need to be Christian to be truly British, and over half of them disagree. (Table 12) Similarly, less than one in ten agrees that people who do not hold Christian values do not belong in Britain, and two-thirds disagree. A similar pattern can be seen with regard to whether the Prime Minister should be a Christian. Whatever else they are, these people are clearly not Christian nationalists, in any meaningful sense of that phrase.

Table 12: Values Integrationist view on classic “Christian nationalist” issues

	Strongly agree	Slightly agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Slightly disagree	Strongly disagree
To be truly British you should be a Christian	3%	6%	34%	23%	32%
People who do not hold Christian values do not belong in Britain	2%	7%	20%	31%	36%
It is important for the political leader of my country to be a Christian	4%	11%	45%	18%	18%

However, **they are much more positive than the two Separatist groups above about some kind of role for Christianity in British political and national life.** They are, on balance, in favour of the law being based on Christian values, of Christianity playing an important role in shaping national identity, of religious education prioritising

Christianity, and, perhaps most strikingly, of the government formally stating that Britain is a Christian country. (Table 13)

Table 13: Values Integrationist view on the role of Christianity in national life

	Strongly agree	Slightly agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Slightly disagree	Strongly disagree
The law in Britain should be based on Christian values	21%	43%	23%	6%	6%
Religious education in Britain should prioritise the teaching of Christianity	19%	39%	28%	6%	4%
Christianity should continue to play an important role in shaping national identity	29%	52%	13%	3%	2%
The government should formally state that Britain is a Christian country	20%	31%	31%	11%	5%

In short, **they favour some kind of ‘soft’ institutional ‘entanglement’ between Christianity and the British state, law and culture.**

Why? In answering this, we must first recognise that, in spite of their differences with the Separatists, Values Integrationists share many of their concerns. Indeed, when it comes to the question of what is wrong with Britain, Cultural Separatists are closer to Values Integrationists (in spite of their disagreement about Christianity) than they are to Committed Separatist (with whom they obviously share

strong separatist tendencies). Values Integrationists have similar, relatively high, levels of concern when it comes to perceived external threats to Britain. (Table 14) Indeed, in some instances, they are *more* concerned than the Cultural Separatists.

Table 14: Concern with ‘external threats’ to Britain (Cultural Separatists vs Values Integrationists)

	Cultural Separatists	Values Integrationists
The level of immigration (very concerned)	40%	41%
Lack of integration among migrant communities (very concerned)	22%	26%
Number of Muslims (very concerned)	18%	21%
Numbers of asylum seekers (very concerned)	38%	45%
Spread of sharia law (very concerned)	23%	31%
I feel like a stranger in my own country (net agree)	34%	40%
Immigration is fine in principle, but our system is overwhelmed (net agree)	71%	76%
Britain is too ethnically mixed (net agree)	38%	42%
We need to send illegal migrants back to their own country (net agree)	70%	72%

Predictably, this group is as happy (or rather unhappy) at the prospect of the next British Prime Minister being a Muslim as Cultural Separatists (35% net unhappy vs 32% respectively).

Values Integrationists have similar levels of concern as Separatists when it comes to perceived *internal* threats to Britain too, though they tend to see these as less of a problem than external threats. (Table 15)

Table 15: Concern with ‘internal threats’ to Britain (Cultural Separatists vs Values Integrationists)

	Cultural Separatists	Values Integrationists
Threats to freedom of speech (very concerned)	22%	26%
Gender identity (e.g. the trans debate) (very concerned)	10%	11%
Crime law and order (very concerned)	31%	32%
People being required to carry a national ID card (very concerned)	19%	18%

The only ‘internal threats’ that rise to the same level of anxiety as the perceived external threats are those relating to traditions, and again, here, Values Integrationists exhibit similar levels of unhappiness as Cultural Separatists. (Table 16)

Table 16: Concern with threats to tradition and traditional values in Britain (Cultural Separatists vs Values Integrationists)

	Cultural Separatists	Values Integrationists
The local authority removes an old statue in your town because they consider it to be racist (net unhappy)	56%	57%
We have lost traditional family values in Britain (net agree)	62%	75%

It is clear, then, that many of the things that upset and motivate Cultural Separatists also upset and motivate Values Integrationists. The key different between these groups is that, **unlike Cultural Separatists, Values Integrationists see Christianity as an element of the Britishness they are wanting to defend** (albeit far less so than later groups, as we shall see). Thus, in spite of being in broad

agreement with Cultural Separatists on what issues are of concern in Britain today, there is a clear difference when it comes to one of them: namely, the decline of Christianity. (Table 17) When asked this, two thirds (67%) of Values Integrationists showed any level of concern (and 12% were very concerned), whilst a quarter (25%) of Cultural Separatists showed any concern, and precisely none of them were very concerned.

Table 17: Concern with the decline of Christianity (Cultural Separatists vs Values Integrationists)

	Cultural Separatists	Values Integrationists
Any concern	25%	67%
Very concerned	0%	12%

This noted, **there is also a certain ambivalence and uncertainty about the extent and way in which Values Integrationists want to defend the relationship between Christianity and Britain.** They are not especially mobilised or activist in their ambitions, or at least somewhat torn on the matter. For example, while, as noted, 58% of Values Integrationists agree that “religious education in Britain should prioritise the teaching of Christianity”, 59% agree that “all religions in Britain should be treated equally in public life.” (Table 18)

Table 18: Values Integrationists on the role of Christianity and other religions in national life

	Religious education in Britain should prioritise the teaching of Christianity	All religions in Britain should be treated equally in public life
Strongly agree	19%	26%
Slightly agree	39%	33%
Neither agree nor disagree	28%	24%
Slightly disagree	6%	10%
Strongly disagree	4%	4%

Values Integrationists want to preserve some aspect of Christianity in Britishness (which ones, we shall turn to below) **but not at the expense of becoming too muscular or exclusionary about it.** (One hypothesis here is that it might be precisely the openness and tolerance they associate with Christian values – see below – that they want to see preserved, and that is why they are unwilling to adopt an approach to that cultural preservation that might defeat that object.)

What else do we know about this group? There is very little to distinguish this group in terms of gender, class, income, ethnicity, education, or urban/rural residence. (See Appendix) They are slightly older (more likely than average to be Gen X, Boomer or above) and, accordingly, slightly more likely to be retired/ less likely to be in full-time employment. They do not have a particular political characteristic, although they are slightly more affiliated to parties on the right (Conservatives and Reform) than those on the left.

Importantly, however, Values Integrationists do not have the same sense of disaffection or alienation that was evident among the

Cultural Separatists. This is a repeated theme in the findings. Values Integrationists feel a reasonably strong sense of community and have a reasonably strong friendship network. They think that their local area is a place where people from different backgrounds get on well together. They are more likely than Cultural Separatists to say that their life is spiritually full (35% net agree vs 20%) and also more likely to agree that their “life has an underlying purpose” (47% net agree vs 34%).

On a larger scale, **they are consistently more positive than Cultural Separatists about national values and pride.** The two groups are remarkably similar in the ‘footprint’ of their ideas of what is most important when it comes to being British. (Table 19)

Table 19: Which ONE of these factors is MOST important for being truly British? (Cultural Separatists vs Values Integrationists)

	Cultural Separatists	Values Integrationists
To be white	1%	1%
To contribute economically	10%	11%
To respect the authority of parliament	1%	3%
To have been born here	15%	15%
To be able to speak English	15%	15%
To be a Christian	1%	-
To share national customs and traditions	10%	11%
To be committed to democracy and freedom of speech	15%	11%
To defend the country when people criticise it	4%	4%
To obey the law	10%	10%
To be proud of Britain	10%	14%

To live here	4%	4%
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As the above table shows, these two groups have almost exactly the same priorities when it comes to what makes Britishness. Where they do differ is how far / how strongly they hold these qualities to be important. Time and again, Values Integrationists are more inclined to agree that *each* characteristic is important to being British. (Table 20) In effect, they have a ‘thicker sense’ of what it is to be British. Britishness, for them, is a function of multiple factors rather than just one or two.

Table 20: How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about being truly British? (net agree) (Cultural Separatists vs Values Integrationists)

	Cultural Separatists	Values Integrationists
To be white	12%	13%
To contribute economically	73%	84%
To respect the authority of parliament	50%	67%
To have been born here	48%	45%
To be able to speak English	82%	86%
To be a Christian	4%	8%
To share national customs and traditions	66%	79%
To be committed to democracy and freedom of speech	69%	82%
To defend the country when people criticise it	51%	68%
To obey the law	84%	85%
To be proud of Britain	63%	76%
To live here	69%	70%

To be sure, some of the differences (living here, obeying the law, speaking English) are minimal but it is noticeable the ones that are more substantial – defending the country when people criticise it, respecting the authority of Parliament, being committed to democracy and freedom of speech, being proud of Britain – relate to pride and satisfaction with British political culture.

This picture is strengthened further, when it comes specifically to the question of what (if anything) makes you proud to be British. (Table 21)

Table 21: How much, if at all, do the following things make you proud or ashamed of your country? (net proud)

	Cultural Separatists	Values Integrationists
Our national history	63%	73%
Our national culture, e.g. music, art and literature	72%	81%
National ceremonial occasions and symbols, e.g. national anthem and flag	58%	73%
National sporting events and teams	65%	74%
Our political values	31%	50%
Our countryside	82%	83%
Our commitment to international law and institutions	37%	55%
The way we treat immigrants and asylum seekers	20%	23%
The fact that my country is predominantly white	16%	23%
The way we treat vulnerable people (e.g. poor, sick, unemployed)	29%	46%
The way we treat people from ethnic and religious minority groups	25%	40%
Our commitment to human rights	42%	60%

Values Integrationists are not only consistently more likely to be proud of Britain than Cultural Separatists, but they are considerably prouder in some key areas. As one might expect by now, these are either political – “our political values”, “our commitment to international law and institutions”, “our commitment to human rights” – or social – “the way we treat vulnerable people (e.g. poor, sick, unemployed)”, “the way we treat people from ethnic and religious minority groups”. They are also more likely to agree that “the best days for our country lie ahead of us” than are Cultural Separatists (27% net agree vs 15%).

In short, **Values Integrationists want to defend Britain from what they see as external threats, but they are not driven to do so by feeling particularly isolated, forgotten, or socially disenfranchised.** Although they are just as likely as Cultural Separatists to feel that Britain is facing some kind of (largely external) threat, they are more likely to think that the country is working for them, more likely to feel that Britain’s political and institutional settlement is something that is worth preserving, and also more likely to feel that Christianity is part of that package.

Not surprisingly, religion is more important to them than to either kind of Separatist (although not that different to the sample as a whole). (Table 22) Nearly six in ten (58%) of Values Integrationists claim a Christian affiliation; 30% say religion is extremely or quite important to them; 38% said they definitely believe in God or some ‘higher power’; 13% say they attend a religious service weekly. In a

similar way, the group is marginally more likely to have been baptised/confirmed, to pray, and to have an interest in the Bible.

Table 22: Religious identity, attitudes, beliefs and interests (Cultural Separatists vs Values Integrationists vs Total Sample)

	Cultural Separatists	Values Integrationists	Total Sample
Not religious / I don't have a religion / faith	65%	33%	46%
Christian affiliation	26%	58%	46%
Churchgoing (at least weekly attender)	3%	13%	11%
Importance of religion (extremely or quite important)	9%	30%	26%
I definitely believe in God or some 'higher power'	15%	38%	30%
Pray (at least weekly)	12%	31%	24%
Interested in the Bible	11%	38%	30%
I believe that God has got a special plan for Britain (agree)	4%	16%	16%

In effect, Values Integrationists are no ‘more Christian’ than the sample average but are more Christian than Cultural Separatists, despite sharing many of their social concerns.

Of all the religious factors we measured, the one that does mark out Values Integrationists and serves as a key to understanding them, is their view of what it means to be a Christian. Asked to choose just one from a list of ten options,¹⁹ 40% of the Values Integrationists said it was “holding Christian values”, the next highest option for this group being “trying to follow Jesus in your life” chosen by just 11%. (For context, “holding Christian values” was, when pressed, the most important option for all the five groups identified, but never

by such a large margin.) **For Values Integrationists, Christianity is a value-based phenomenon, which has pervaded Britain’s history, culture and institutions, which has done it good and which is worth protecting, although not necessarily defending vigorously.**

The final two groups are much smaller than the three that have preceded. They are both integrationists in that they share with Values Integrationists the desire to see Christianity integrated into national life. However, they are both much more intentional and focused on this point, albeit for different reasons.

Group 4: Identity Integrationists (11%)



The fourth group is the smallest of the five identified but the most focused and intense in their views on the relationship between Christianity and Britain. They are as adamant and clear as the Committed Separatists about the proper relationship between Christianity and the British state (and nation) – only in the opposite direction. Their coherence on this point is hard to overstate:

- 99% agree that “the law in Britain should be based on Christian values” (83% strongly)
- 99% agree that “Christianity should continue to play an important role in shaping national identity” (85% strongly)
- 98% agree that “Religious education in Britain should prioritise the teaching of Christianity” (84% strongly)
- 98% agree that “the government should formally state that Britain is a Christian country” (82% strongly)
- 91% agree that “It is important for the political leader of my country to be a Christian” (61% strongly), and
- 100% would be unhappy if their local church closed and turned into a mosque” (92% of them being very unhappy)

This shows coherence and consistency by anyone’s measure. Not surprisingly, a majority – albeit a smaller one – of the group agrees with the golden “Christian nationalist” questions. (Table 23)

Table 23: Identity Integrationists on “Christian nationalist” ideas

	Strongly agree	Slightly agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Slightly disagree	Strongly disagree
To be truly British you should be a Christian	36%	25%	21%	13%	4%
People who do not hold Christian values do not belong in Britain	35%	25%	22%	12%	5%

These data seem to make clear – indeed, to shout – that this group are Christian nationalists, in as far as any of the five groups merits this title. However, there are different ways in which “Christian nationalism” can be understood and made manifest, and some of the Identity Integrationist’s answers to key LCA questions can bring a bit of nuance to an otherwise simplistic picture. In short, **this group are, for all intents and purposes, Christian nationalist, but they show a particular ‘flavour’ of Christian nationalism.**

Of all the five groups identified, Identity Integrationists have the most discernible demographic and socio-economic signature. (See Appendix) Although they are not distinct in terms of gender or education, the group is more likely to be C2DE (50% vs 45% total sample) albeit it is not lower on income. They are least likely to live in an urban area (19% vs 29% total sample), most likely to be retired (31% vs 21% of total sample) and least likely to be in full-time work (38% vs 45%). Most notably, they are more likely to be older (especially Gen X and Boomer) and white (93% vs 86% total sample). Politically speaking, they are overwhelmingly the most likely of all five groups to be affiliated with (43%) and to intend to vote (48%) Reform, with commensurately low association with parties of the left.

This group feels some of the disaffection we found in the Cultural Separatist group, but in a different way. At a personal level, they are less frustrated than Cultural Separatists: more likely to say that they think their life is spiritually full, or that it has an underlying purpose, or that they are “generally pretty satisfied” with it at the moment.²⁰ (Table 24)

Table 24: General satisfaction with life (Cultural Separatists vs Identity Integrationists)

	Cultural Separatists	Identity Integrationists
I feel that my life is spiritually full (net agree)	20%	38%
My life has an underlying purpose (net agree)	34%	44%
I am generally pretty satisfied with my life at the moment (net agree)	41%	50%
I feel a sense of belonging and support within my local community (net agree)	32%	49%
I feel lonely much of the time (net agree)	34%	26%

At a more abstract level, however, they are notably more discontented. They are least likely to be trusting, least likely to say that their local area is a place where people from different backgrounds get on well together, and considerably more likely to say that they feel like a stranger in their own country. (Table 25)

Table 25: Attitude to strength of social bonds in community and country (Cultural Separatists vs. Identity Integrationists)

	Cultural Separatists	Identity Integrationists
You can't be too careful [when it comes to trusting others]	17%	29%
Your local area is a place where people from different backgrounds get on well together (net disagree)	11%	25%
I feel like a stranger in my own country (net agree)	34%	70%

This sense of disaffection, alienation and frustration becomes still more palpable when it comes to how Identity Integrationists feel about the state of Britain. This is clearly the most anxious of all the groups. It is not just that they register a very high level of concern for the kind of issues one might expect:

- 83% are very concerned about the level of immigration
- 54% are very concerned about the lack of integration among migrant communities
- 67% are very concerned about the number of Muslims in Britain
- 85% are very concerned about the number of asylum seekers

They are also the group most concerned about:

- crime, law and order (59% very concerned)
- threats to freedom of speech (46% very concerned)
- rise of the far left (46% very concerned)
- public finances and debt (43% very concerned)
- the portrayal of our national historical past (40% very concerned)
- people being required to carry a national ID card (35% very concerned)

- the threat from Russia or other hostile states, (35% very concerned)
- gender identity (e.g. the trans debate) (25% very concerned)

In only a handful of topics – all of them ‘left-coded’ issues: mental health problems among young people, the rise of the far right, the level of racism, climate change, the gap between the elites and ordinary people – is this trend reversed.

Predictably, their right-leaning disaffection is writ largest on the national canvas. More than nine in ten – 91% – think Britain is in a state of moral decay, and 97% agree that we have lost traditional family values in Britain. Moreover, their disaffection extends beyond Britain, with 80% agreeing that “Europe is no longer confident about what it stands for” (vs 50% total sample).

How does Christianity fit into this picture of relative personal contentment combined with wider social anxiety and disaffection? This group has a very high – indeed the highest – level of Christian affiliation of all groups. (Table 26) They say that religion is important to them. They confidently believe in God (though not quite to the same level as Belief Integrationists), are the group most likely to be baptised or christened, and also to have a high level of interest in the Bible, though again not quite as high as Belief Integrationists. They are the group the highest proportion of which, when asked what is important to being a Christian, say “Believing Jesus was the Son of God” (57%) or “Following the teachings of the Church” (41%), though those things are not the *most* important thing about Christianity as far as they are concerned (see below). Nearly half – 45% – are very concerned about the decline of Christianity in Britain.

Table 26: Attitude to Christianity (Identity Integrationists vs Total Sample)

	Identity Integrationists	Total Sample
Christian affiliation	81%	46%
Importance of religion (extremely or quite important)	43%	26%
I definitely believe in God or some ‘higher power’	49%	30%
Baptised or christened	81%	66%
Current interest in the Bible (interested)	47%	30%
Decline of Christianity (very concerned)	45%	13%

These are notably high levels of affiliation, belief, interest and concern, but they are not translated into similarly disproportionately high levels of practice. The level of churchgoing in this group is relatively modest (13% weekly attend), and while this is slightly higher than the overall sample (11%), it is not as high as one might expect from a group that is clearly so culturally sympathetic to and defensive of Christianity. Similarly, this group scores lower than the following group (Belief Integrationists), with whom they share many Christian concerns, on things like praying regularly (31% vs 46% pray at least weekly), or in considering regular prayer and Bible reading to be important to being a Christian.

This conclusion is further borne out by their sense of the most important factor when it comes to being a Christian. As noted earlier, the factor that was most likely to be mentioned by all five groups was “Holding Christian values”, albeit the Values Integrationists were clearly most enamoured by this idea. Identity Integrationists also favour this understanding of Christianity (31%), but where they differ is that they also answer in double digits for the factors “Defending our Christian heritage and culture” (18%) and “Trying to make sure

our country stays Christian” (16%). None of the other groups comes close to this level of sympathy with these two factors. Identity Integrationists are also the only group that had no one give the answer “Being an active member of a church” to this question, although to be fair, results from other groups were also low here. What all this tends to show is that **Identity Integrationists are deeply, indeed viscerally, culturally Christian, but their Christianity tends to be a bit more cultural and heritage based than it is practising.**

Strongly attached to the idea of Christianity, this group is also strongly attached to the idea of Britain, and to the idea of the nation more generally (only 5% agree that “nationalism is a virus”). This group has the ‘thickest’ concept of Britishness, by which we mean it is the group that is most likely to agree that a wide range of different options are important to being British. (Table 27)

Table 27: How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about being truly British? (Net agree) (Identity Integrationists vs Total Sample)

	Identity Integrationists	Total Sample
... be white	42%	16%
... contribute economically	97%	76%
... respect the authority of parliament	75%	60%
... have been born here	75%	46%
... be able to speak English	99%	77%
... share national customs and traditions	94%	68%
... be committed to democracy and freedom of speech	97%	77%
... defend the country when people criticise it	90%	57%
... obey the law	94%	83%
... be proud of Britain	98%	67%
... live here	83%	68%

In short, Identity Integrationists are not just nationalists, but they are nationalists of every kind: civic/ political, natal, economic, cultural, and ethnic.

When forced to choose which one factor is most important to Britishness, two of the above list were selected by 21% of Identity Integrationists: “being born here” and “sharing national customs and traditions”, with a further 16% saying “being able to speak English”. **Ultimately, natal and cultural forms of nationalism win out for them over other forms – political, ethnic, economic – but that should not eclipse the point of quite how ‘thick’ and demanding their conception of Britishness is.**

This is further visible in their notions of pride in Britain, which are, predictably, very high. They are, however, less *uniformly* high, in a way

that is instructive. Identity Integrationists are intensely proud about some things: national history, national culture, countryside, national ceremonial occasions and symbols, and, to a slightly lesser extent, national sporting events and teams. In each case, well over four in five people express some pride. (Table 28)

Table 28: Pride in Britain (1) (net proud) (Identity Integrationists vs Total Sample)

	Identity Integrationists	Total Sample
Our national history	95%	64%
Our national culture, e.g. music, art and literature	96%	77%
National ceremonial occasions and symbols, e.g. national anthem and flag	92%	61%
National sporting events and teams	83%	66%
Our countryside	96%	83%

There are some factors about which they are less obviously proud, however. Although still slightly more proud than average, their attitude to Britain’s political values, and its treatment of immigrants and asylum seekers, ethnic and religious minorities, and vulnerable people (e.g. poor, sick, unemployed) is a little less exuberant. (Table 29) Moreover, their pride in Britain’s commitment to international law and institutions, and to human rights is actually lower than the national average.

Table 29: Pride in Britain (2) (net proud) (Identity Integrationists vs Total Sample)

	Identity Integrationists	Total Sample
Our political values	54%	41%
The way we treat vulnerable people (e.g. poor, sick, unemployed)	47%	38%
The way we treat people from ethnic and religious minority groups	38%	31%
The way we treat immigrants and asylum seekers	24%	22%
Our commitment to international law and institutions	48%	50%
Our commitment to human rights	46%	53%

It is worth noting, that these are also the factors that the Committed Separatists were not proud (indeed considerably less proud) about for Britain. In the light of this, it is probably not too far-fetched to hypothesise that Committed Separatists were not proud of these values because they felt Britain was failing to live up to them, whereas Identity Integrationists were not proud because Britain was trying to live up to them.²¹

Finally, when it comes to matters of national identity and pride, it's important to stress that **there is also a substantial racist contingent among Identity Integrationists**. 42% of them agree that being white is important to being truly British, and 6% say it is the most important element of being British. Nearly half (45%) say they would be unhappy if they visited their local hospital and most of staff there were from ethnic minorities; 70% say they are proud that Britain “is predominantly white”, and 84% say that Britain is too ethnically mixed. Race clearly plays a part in their attitude to Britain and presumably too in their attitude to Christianity. This is the group, after

all, that is most likely to agree that Christianity is a Western religion (46% vs 27% total sample).

As one would expect from these attitudes to Britain, Christianity and the nation, **Identity Integrationists are the most hostile to ‘alien’ presences**. Although 82% say that “immigration is fine in principle, but our system is overwhelmed”, 90% agree that “immigration makes life harder for people already in this country”, and 92% that we need to send illegal migrants back to their own country. Roughly the same number (89%) said they would be unhappy if temporary accommodation for asylum seekers were set up in their local area. Identity Integrationists are the group least happy at the prospect of someone from a different religion marrying into their family (41% net unhappy vs 14% total sample), or someone from a different ethnic group doing so (39% net unhappy vs 13% total sample)

Their anxiety and ire are focused on Islam and Muslims, with any and all signs of the alleged Islamification of Britain – churches turning into mosques, political influence of Muslims, local influence of Muslims, spread of sharia law, etc. – being powerfully rejected. (Table 30) A remarkably high proportion of Identity Integrationists also believe in the so-called “Great Replacement” theory.

Table 30: Attitudes to Islam (Identity Integrationists vs Total Sample)

	Identity Integrationists	Total Sample
The local church closes and is turned into a mosque (net unhappy)	100%	55%
The next political leader elected in Britain is a Muslim (net unhappy)	85%	32%
Your local primary school's sex education curriculum changes due to pressure from Muslim parents (net unhappy)	95%	66%
Islam is completely compatible with British values (net agree)	4%	23%
The white population in Europe is deliberately being replaced by migrants from Muslim countries	82%	37%
The spread of sharia (very concerned)	75%	28%

Finally, but still highly relevant, Identity Integrationists appear to be mobilised. When asked whether they thought “Political violence is sometimes necessary”, 21% *agreed* (though this was not the highest score on this from a group). When asked whether protest groups should be banned – examples from both the left and right, Palestine Action and the EDL were given – 58% agreed (vs 39% total sample). And when faced with the statement “Right now we need ‘strong man’ political leaders who are prepared to break the rules”, 71% agreed (vs. 36% total sample).

Group 5: Belief Integrationists (13%)



The final group, Belief Integrationists, is also small. At 13% of the population, it is slightly larger than Identity Integrationists, with which it shares many characteristics. It is, however, different in a number of key respects.

Belief Integrationists are characterised by a similar strong eagerness to see Christianity embedded within British social, political and cultural arrangements, albeit without quite the same intensity as Identity Integrationists. (Table 31)

Table 31: Relationship between Christianity and British state/ nation (Identity Integrationists vs Belief Integrationists)

	Identity Integrationists		Belief Integrationists	
	Strongly agree	Slightly agree	Strongly agree	Slightly agree
The law in Britain should be based on Christian values	83%	16%	51%	38%
Christianity should continue to play an important role in shaping national identity	85%	14%	60%	36%
The government should formally state that Britain is a Christian country	82%	16%	58%	34%
It is important for the political leader of my country to be a Christian	61%	30%	48%	47%

In a similar vein, whereas 45% of Identity Integrationists are “very concerned” about the decline of Christianity, 32% of Belief Integrationists are.

Accordingly, there is a clear Christian nationalist streak within this group, with somewhere between a third and a half of Belief

Integrationists registering such sentiments, higher than every group except for Identity Integrationists. (Table 32)

Table 32: Key Christian nationalist measures (Belief Integrationists)

	Strongly agree	Slightly agree
To be truly British you should be a Christian	25%	26%
People who do not hold Christian values do not belong in Britain	17%	27%

So far, this picture seems clear: Belief Integrationists are simply a less intense version of Identity Integrationists. However, the data show that in several important regards **the “integrationist” opinions of Belief Integrationists are different to those of Identity Integrationists.**

We can see this in a number of the key LCA questions. As we have noted several times already, people were asked which factors they thought were important, and which were most important, to being a Christian. As we saw in the last section, Identity Integrationists leaned heavily into cultural/ traditional factors here. (Table 33) The difference with Belief Integrationists, with whom they share so many Christian concerns, is notable.

Table 33: Which of these factors do you think are important to being a Christian? (Identity Integrationists vs Belief Integrationists vs Total Sample)

Defending our Christian heritage and culture	Identity Integrationists	Belief Integrationists	Total Sample
Important for being Christian	90%	18%	23%
Most important for being Christian	18%	2%	4%
Trying to make sure our country stays Christian			
Important for being Christian	79%	6%	12%
Most important for being Christian	16%	1%	2%

While Identity Integrationists are inclined to see being a Christian as a heritage, culture and identity thing, Belief Integrationists are much less concerned with these factors. Their Christianity appears less cultural.

People were also asked whether they agreed that “God has got a special plan for Britain”. In spite of claiming very high levels of Christian affiliation and saying that religion tends to be important in their lives, Identity Integrationists are largely ambivalent, or at least torn, on this issue. Belief Integrationists, by contrast, are a bit more positive. (Table 34)

Table 34: “God has got a special plan for Britain” (Identity Integrationists vs Belief Integrationists vs Total Sample)

	Identity Integrationists	Belief Integrationists	Total Sample
Strongly agree	20%	28%	8%
Slightly agree	9%	25%	8%
Neither agree nor disagree	34%	23%	25%
Slightly disagree	7%	5%	8%
Strongly disagree	16%	10%	40%

Finally, among the key LCA questions, respondents were asked whether they thought Christian values required that we welcome and support asylum seekers. Whereas Identity Integrationists were hostile to this idea (60% disagreeing, 19% agreeing), Belief Integrationists were positive (23% disagreeing, 48% agreeing). (Table 35)

Table 35: Christian values and asylum (Identity Integrationists vs Belief Integrationists)

“Christian values require that we welcome and support asylum seekers”	Identity Integrationists	Belief Integrationists
Strongly agree	5%	16%
Slightly agree	14%	32%
Neither agree nor disagree	19%	27%
Slightly disagree	19%	10%
Strongly disagree	41%	13%

It’s also worth noting that Belief Integrationists are happier with the idea of equal treatment of religions in Britain, with 63% agreeing that “All religions in Britain should be treated equally in public life”, compared with 30% of Identity Integrationists.

These results suggest that Belief Integrationists differ from Identity Integrationists not simply in the lower intensity of their Christian nationalist sentiments, but also in other dimensions, namely (1) their understanding and engagement with the faith itself, and (2) the nature of their social concerns. We will look at each of these in turn.

In some regards, these two groups are very similar in their engagement with Christianity. They share similar levels of Christian affiliation, and baptism/ being christened, and are both equally confident in their belief in God. (Table 36)

Table 36: Christian characteristics (1) (Identity Integrationists vs Belief Integrationists)

	Identity Integrationists	Belief Integrationists
Christian affiliation	81%	77%
Baptised or christened	81%	78%
I definitely believe in God or some ‘higher power’	49%	55%

Differences become evident, however, when it comes to the importance of religion in their lives, their interest in the Bible, their frequency of prayer and, in particular, their level of churchgoing, with 31% of Belief Integrationists attending weekly, compared to 13% of Identity Integrationists. When considering this, it is also worth noting that Belief Integrationists report the highest proportion of people saying that “Believing that Jesus was the Son of God” is the most important factor for being a Christian. **In other words, this group is more likely to be motivated in their views by an active, practised Christian faith than by a deeply-felt cultural attachment.** (Table 37)

Table 37: Christian characteristics (2) (Identity Integrationists vs Belief Integrationists)

	Identity Integrationists	Belief Integrationists
Importance of religion (extremely or quite important)	43%	55%
Interested in the Bible	47%	62%
Churchgoing (weekly attender)	13%	31%
Pray (at least weekly)	31%	46%
Believing that Jesus was the Son of God (as most important factor for being Christian)	9%	14%

In short, **Belief Integrationists hold strong integrationist tendencies, but they do so because, for the most part, they want to promote Christianity rather than preserve it.**

This forward-looking (though not progressive – that would be a misleading term) Christian approach also differs from that of Identity Integrationists when it comes to the question of social concerns. Belief Integrationists exhibit, as a rule, comparatively high levels of social concern (generally higher than Committed Separatists, Cultural Separatists and Values Integrationists) but they are markedly *less concerned* than Identity Integrationists, particularly on the issue of perceived outside threats. (Table 38)

Table 38: Concern with social issues (1) (Identity Integrationists vs Belief Integrationists)

Social issues (very concerned)	Identity Integrationists	Belief Integrationists
The level of immigration	83%	54%
Lack of integration among migrant communities	54%	33%
Number of Muslims	67%	40%
Numbers of asylum seekers	85%	50%
Spread of sharia	75%	44%

Despite their higher level of Christian practice, they are also a bit less concerned about the decline of Christianity (32% concerned vs. 45% of Identity Integrationists).

To be clear, Belief Integrationists aren’t exactly enthusiastic about these social issues – their opinions are consistently more concerned about them than the overall population. However, they are (considerably) less concerned about them than Identity Integrationists, for whom these issues were a driving force in their attitude to Christianity and the nation.

What else can we say about Belief Integrationists? Demographically and socio-economically, this group is more likely than the sample average to be male. It is a bit younger, though Millennial-younger rather than Gen Z-younger, and also the group most likely to be non-white (20% vs. 13% total sample). Interestingly, while Belief Integrationists are not notably different in social grade, they are the one group in which there is a visible difference in income (likely to be lower income than the average). They are bit more likely to be urban-living, and to work full time, as well as having the highest level of education level. Politically speaking too, there is not much to

distinguish them, as is illustrated by the fact that they are more likely to be either Reform or Labour. (See Appendix)

When it comes to their personal life, Belief Integrationists are perhaps the most contented of the five groups identified. They are most likely to agree that “there is a strong local community” to which they are connected and in which they participate (28% vs 19% total sample). They have a reasonably solid level of close friends, and are most likely to say

- “I feel that my life is spiritually full” (48% vs 30% total sample)
- “My life has an underlying purpose” (55% vs 42% total sample)
- “I feel a sense of belonging and support within my local community” (56% vs 43% total sample)
- “I am happy about the state of my life right now” (52% vs 45% total sample)

Relative personal contentment does not translate into broader social contentment, however. **Belief Integrationists do not have the same breadth and depth of concerns as Identity Integrationists, but they still tend to score higher than the national average when it comes to most social issues.** (Table 39)

Table 39: Concern with social issues (2) (Identity Integrationists vs Belief Integrationists)

Social issues (very concerned)	Identity Integrationists	Belief Integrationists
Threats to freedom of speech	46%	35%
Gender identity (e.g. the trans debate)	25%	24%
Public finances and debt	43%	35%
The portrayal of our national historical past	40%	23%
People being required to carry a national ID card	35%	25%
Rise of the far left	46%	25%

That noted, there are some issues in which their social concern is not different from, and indeed slightly less than, the national average, such as the level of racism (25% very concerned vs 25% total sample), climate change (21% vs 25%), the rise of the far right (15% vs 24%), and mental health problems among young people (23% vs 26%).

More generally, when it comes to the national mood or culture, rather than specific issues, Belief Integrationists are quite downbeat, with 77% agreeing that “Britain is in a state of moral decay” (compared to 91% Identity Integrationists and 59% of the total sample), and 80% agreeing that we have lost traditional family values in Britain (compared to 97% Identity Integrationists and 61% of total sample).

The social analysis of Belief Integrationists is not very different from that of Identity Integrationists. For example, 65% say “We have become too obsessed with human rights” (compared with 79% of Identity Integrationists). However, there is one detail that is small but worthy of mention. **A third (34%) of Belief Integrationists agree that “Social problems today are ultimately down to feminism and erosion of traditional masculine values”,** which is not only higher than the

total sample (16%) but also higher than Identity Integrationists (30%). In a similar vein, Belief Integrationists are the most pro-natalist of the five groups, with 28% saying that “the government should encourage women to have more children” compared to 13% of the total sample, and 22% of Identity Integrationists. (Table 40)

Table 40: Social attitudes and beliefs (Identity Integrationists vs Belief Integrationists)

Social attitudes and beliefs (net agree)	Identity Integrationists	Belief Integrationists
We have become too obsessed with human rights	79%	65%
Social problems today are ultimately down to feminism and erosion of traditional masculine values	30%	34%
The government should encourage women to have more children	22%	28%

In other words, **this group does have a (slightly) more traditional moral orientation than Identity Integrationists, whose Christian orientation is motivated more by perceived external threats rather than internal doctrinal beliefs.**

This difference is driven home especially clearly in the comparative views concerning migration (and asylum), race, nationhood, and Muslims. Belief Integrationists are not exactly positive about immigration, and certainly not as positive as some of the other groups, but they are nothing like as negative as Identity Integrationists, for whom these things are close to an existential threat. (Table 41)

Table 41: Attitudes to immigration (Identity Integrationists vs Belief Integrationists)

Attitudes to immigration (net agree)	Identity Integrationists	Belief Integrationists
Europe needs migration in order to survive	9%	27%
Immigration makes life harder for people already in this country	90%	67%
We need to send illegal migrants back to their own country	92%	79%
I feel like a stranger in my own country	70%	49%

That noted, there are a couple of outlying data points here that gesture towards a slightly different perspective on Belief Integrationists. When asked whether “we should aim for a world with no national borders”, nearly a third of this group *agreed*, which is considerably higher than any other group, except Committed Separatists. (By comparison, 5% of Identity Integrationists agreed with this). In a different but connected vein, 38% of Belief Integrationists said that “the best days for our country lie ahead of us”. This was the highest level of all groups.

It seems that, **in spite of their general, albeit widely shared, sense that Britain is on the moral slide, Belief Integrationists retain a comparatively high level of idealism, motivated by a nagging sense that not only could things get better, but idealistic hopes need not be fantasies.**

This idealism with regard to borders or the future of the country tempers rather than transforms their attitude to the nation. Belief Integrationists are much more nervous about nationalism than Identity Integrationists (25% agree it is a virus compared to 5% of that group). Moreover, nearly a third of them (31%) agree with an accusation that could (sometimes legitimately) be levelled at some

Identity Integrationists, namely that “concerns about ‘protecting our national culture’ are basically a smokescreen for racism.” (Not surprisingly, only 11% of Identity Integrationists agree with this.)

That noted, **Belief Integrationists do have almost as ‘thick’ a conception of national belonging as Identity Integrationists, with nine (of a possible eleven) factors being judged to be important to being British by more than 80% of the group.**²² When forced to choose, they are quite divided over what is the most important part of Britishness, split between

- having been born here (21%)
- sharing national customs (16%)
- speaking English (14%)
- being proud of Britain (12%)

This is similar, though slightly more diverse, to Identity Integrationists, and Belief Integrationists exhibit a comparably deep pride in the nation. But there are two subtle differences here. First, in those cultural, historical, ceremonial and ethnic dimensions that mattered so much to Identity Integrationists, Belief Integrationists were slightly less proud. (Table 42)

Table 42: *Pride in the nation (1) (Identity Integrationists vs Belief Integrationists)*

Pride in the nation (net proud)	Identity Integrationists	Belief Integrationists
Our national history	95%	84%
Our national culture, e.g. music, art and literature	96%	82%
National ceremonial occasions and symbols, e.g. national anthem and flag	92%	79%
National sporting events and teams	83%	77%
Our countryside	96%	89%
Our national history	95%	84%

Second, and by contrast, in those *political* and *institutional* dimensions (where Identity Integrationists were always slightly less impressed), Belief Integrationists were slightly *more* proud. (Table 43)

Table 43: *Pride in the nation (2) (Identity Integrationists vs Belief Integrationists)*

Pride in the nation (net proud)	Identity Integrationists	Belief Integrationists
Our political values	54%	58%
Our commitment to international law and institutions	48%	59%
The way we treat immigrants and asylum seekers	24%	38%
The way we treat vulnerable people (e.g. poor, sick, unemployed)	47%	55%
The way we treat people from ethnic and religious minority groups	38%	48%
Our commitment to human rights	46%	62%

It’s almost as if Belief Integrationists, for all their many differences with them, had just a slight smattering of sympathy with Committed Separatists.

If so, you wouldn’t want to push the comparison too far, and this is certainly not the case when it comes to their attitude to race which is decidedly mixed. In some regards, the racist traits evident in some Identity Integrationists are also discernible in this group, albeit to a slightly lesser extent.

- 37% of agree that being white is important to being truly British (vs 42% Identity Integrationists)
- 54% say they are proud that Britain “is predominantly white” (vs 70% Identity Integrationists)
- 60% say that Britain is too ethnically mixed (vs 84% Identity Integrationists)

That said, when it comes to other questions relating to race, Belief Integrationists are considerably less hostile than Identity Integrationists, and indeed not very different to the mainstream. For example, 19% say they would be unhappy if they visited their local hospital and most of staff there were from ethnic minorities (vs 45% Identity Integrationists; 15% total sample), and 34% agree that “Believing my country is superior is basically a form of racism” (vs 12% Identity Integrationists)

Some explanation of this might come from the potential elision of race and religion in the minds of Belief Integrationists. When presented with the prospect of “someone from a different ethnic group marrying into your family”, this group was notably less hostile than Identity Integrationists, albeit still slightly more hostile than the national average. When presented with the prospect of “Someone

from a different religion marrying into your family”, that gap closed quite a bit. (Table 44)

Table 44: Marrying into the family (Identity Integrationists vs Belief Integrationists vs Total Sample)

Marrying into the family (net unhappy)	Identity Integrationists	Belief Integrationists	Total Sample
Someone from a different ethnic group marrying into your family	39%	19%	13%
Someone from a different religion marrying into your family	41%	31%	14%

This fact may also go some way to explaining why 39% this group believe “Christianity is a Western religion” (nearly as high as the 46% of Identity Integrationists). One would presumably expect that a group of people, for whom Christianity is clearly important and a third of whom are regular churchgoers, would know that Christianity is not a Western religion, either in origin or current global distribution. But if they view the issue through the lens of Islam, so to speak, they might be more likely to define it as ‘our’ religion, with ‘us’ being those who live in the West.

This would be supported by the fact that **a remarkable two-thirds of this group hold to the Great Replacement theory** (66% agree that “The white population in Europe is deliberately being replaced by migrants from Muslim countries”), which, although not quite as high as the 82% of Identity Integrationists, is much higher than the national average (37% overall)

Even here, however, the potential ‘idealism’ of this group might be visible. When asked whether “Islam is completely compatible with British values”, Belief Integrationists were exactly on the same level

as the national average (23%) and considerably more positive than Identity Integrationists (4%) for whom this is a red line.

There is one final aspect of this group that is worth noting: they are almost as mobilised (and in one case more so) as Identity Integrationists. When it comes to banning certain protest groups, 56% are in favour. When it comes to whether we need “strong man” political leaders who are prepared to break the rules, 62% agree. And when it comes to whether “political violence is sometimes necessary”, 25% of them agree. **In spite – or perhaps because – of that fact that Belief Integrationists have a comparatively strong commitment to the practised faith of Christianity, they incline towards undemocratic means to achieve their religious and national ends.** (Table 45)

Table 45: Political attitudes and mobilisation (Identity Integrationists vs Belief Integrationists)

Political attitudes and mobilisation (net agree)	Identity Integrationists	Belief Integrationists
Protest groups like EDL or Palestine Action should be banned	58%	56%
Right now we need “strong man” political leaders who are prepared to break the rules	71%	62%
Political violence is sometimes necessary	21%	25%

6

2 How do these groups relate to one another?



Having identified and characterised five groups within the UK adult population on the basis of their different attitudes to Christianity and Britishness, it is helpful to place them together on a conceptual map, in order to understand the full 'landscape' of opinion on this matter and how different groups relate to one another.

What follows in this chapter is a series of concept 'maps', each of which draws out a different perspective on how the different groups view Christianity, Britishness and the concept(s) of nationalism, and the extent to which they integrate or not.


Map 1: How Christian is ‘Christian nationalism’?

Each of the five groups identified had a particular ‘signature’ when it came to Christianity – not surprising given that attitudes towards Christianity are likely to be highly relevant to attitudes to the relationship between Christianity and nationhood. This relationship is charted in the first map below.

Map 1 pulls apart each of the five groups according to their constituent religious elements e.g. ‘nones’, ‘nominals’, and ‘practising Christians’ within each group.²³ The relative size of each group is indicated by the size of bar.

These are then plotted (on the y-axis) according to how sympathetic or hostile each subgroup is to the integration of Christianity in Britishness.²⁴ So, for example, those who are more ‘hostile’ on this scale are less keen on the integration of Christianity into a sense of the nation; those who are more ‘sympathetic’ view Christianity and Britishness as more closely related. In this way, the map offers a careful answer to the question of how Christian is Christian nationalism, bearing in mind the ‘Christian’ here, as through the report, can mean different things.

Figure 1: How Christian is ‘Christian nationalism’?



The chart shows that in each of the groups, nominal Christians (the part-shaded bars) are higher up the scale of Christianity integration into Britishness, slightly ahead of the practising Christians (the full-shaded bars). Conversely, and not-surprisingly, the non-believers (the empty bars) are always most hostile to this integration. This indicates that attitudes to the integration of Christianity with Britishness do correlate with religion, but more so with non/ nominal Christianity, rather than practising Christianity. It is also important to observe that even a practising Christian in the ‘Committed Separatist’ category, for example, will be less sympathetic to the integration of Christianity and Britishness than a non-religious person in other categories.

With the groups themselves:

- **Committed Separatists** sit lowest on the scale, and within this group it is the non-religious who are not only dominant but, predictably, strongest in their hostility to Christianity and Britishness. Nominal Christians in this group are a bit more positive about integration, but not much.
- **Cultural Separatists** also sit on the most hostile side of the graph, but they are less uniformly so. Again, the non-religious among the group are the most hostile, and nominal Christians less so (almost to the extent of being neutral on the issue). Practising Christians make up too small a group to be shown here.
- **Values Integrationists** cluster around the neutral midpoint. As with separatist groups, the non-religious among the Values Integrationists are the most hostile to Christianity and Britishness, but the difference between the data points here is a bit smaller. If non-religiosity is the driver of opinion among the Separatists (which it arguably is), it is less of a factor among the Values Integrationists, whose nominal (and even practising) Christians hold similar opinions.
- **Identity Integrationists** show the highest level of sympathy towards the integration of Christianity and Britishness, and among them the nominal Christians show the highest level (though the data points do cluster here).
- **Belief Integrationists** show slightly lower levels of sympathy. Among this group, as with Identity Integrationists, that view is most prevalent among nominal Christians, despite the fact that this group has a higher proportion of practising Christians, who are, in fact, the subgroup least sympathetic to Christianity-in-Britishness within the Belief Integrationists.

What all this suggests is that, while there is a broad correlation between Christian religiosity and attitudes to Christianity-Britishness (it could hardly be otherwise), it is not a uniform or rigid one.

Subgroups exist within all the five groups.


Perhaps most interestingly, sympathy for Christian-Britishness integration in all groups is greatest among nominal Christians rather than practising ones, albeit in some instances by quite small margins.

Map 2: How far is this debate about Christianity or culture?

A second way of mapping these five groups is by plotting their attitude to ‘Christian integration with Britishness’ according to their reasons for doing so. We need to show some caution here. It is impossible to say with any certainty what is actually motivating members of each group. That kind of causality is not available from data like these. What we can do is see what each of the groups says about other salient factors, such as what they think about Christianity, or what they think about defending British culture and traditions. This is what we have done in Map 2.

By ‘Christianity’ here we mean both the dogmatic and practical aspects; in effect, does their view of Christianity have ‘content’ to it. Is it about believing stuff and doing stuff?²⁵ The higher up a group is on this scale (y-axis), the more it thinks that Christianity has intrinsic dogmatic and/or practical elements to it. By ‘cultural’, we mean the extent to which people see Britishness as being about defending Britain’s heritage, customs and traditions, and see Christianity as being about the defence of Christian heritage and culture.²⁶ Again, the higher up this scale they are (x-axis), the keener they are on this cultural dimension. The two dimensions are plotted against each other below.²⁷

Figure 2: How far is this debate about Christianity or culture?



Each bubble represents one group, with bubble size being proportional to the relative size of that group. The grey reference lines through the centre of the chart show the overall sample means.²⁸ The thinner dotted line shows what would be the neutral position on each scale.

The general pattern of this chart is familiar and predictable. Committed Separatists have the lowest Christian and lowest cultural ‘motivations’ in this debate (not surprisingly, given their attitudes both to Christianity, and to Christianity in Britishness), whereas Identity Integrationists have the highest.

The comparable breadth of spread on the two axes is more interesting. None of the groups scores especially highly on the Christianity scale. Indeed, the overall sample is slightly lower than neutral when it comes to the question of Christianity (as we see in the

horizontal mean line). This is a salutary reminder, if we can put it this way, that the UK is not America and **however Christian the debate around Christian nationalism is, the comparably low proportion of believing and practising Christians in the UK (compared to the US) means that this debate is unlikely to get particularly ‘theological’.** Even in those groups where the Christian element of their national commitment is evident (Belief and Identity Integrationists), nominal rather than practising Christians are the largest group.

By comparison, three of the groups are clearly above the mean on the culture scale, and two of them (Belief and Identity Integrationists) are way above it. In other words, considering the sample as a whole, cultural expression of Britishness and of Christianity appears a more divisive factor than ideological commitment to Christianity. **This debate is more about culture, where there is genuine difference, than it is about belief and ideology, where there may be difference, but less acute source of division.**

This is not to claim that Christian belief and practise are completely irrelevant: for some groups, they do matter. However, it is clear that the culture scale produces much stronger differentiation between the five groups. Culture seems to matter here more substantially than faith in this debate.

Maps 3 & 4: What kinds of nationalism drive “Christian nationalism”?

A third way of conceiving the relationship between these five groups is by looking at how the groups relate to different kinds of nationalism. As discussed in this paper²⁹, there are various different kinds of nationalism; different forms of national identity and loyalty. Among the better known are:

- **Political/ civic identity:** To be ‘British’ means to have a commitment to certain political/ legal/ constitutional arrangements and institutions.
- **Ethnic/ natal identity:** To be ‘British’ means being white or having been born here.


These are not mutually exclusive positions. It is quite possible to hold both views or neither, rather than simply one or the other, but they do get at different things. Maps 3 and 4 therefore chart the respective positions on Christian-Britishness – i.e. how hostile or sympathetic each group is to the integration of Christianity with Britishness – against their attitudes to these two different kinds of nationalism.

Map 3 measures how far each group is sympathetic to civic-political nationalism, i.e. how much they agree that to be truly British you need to obey the law, respect the authority of parliament, etc. The further right they are on this scale, the more likely they are to support some kind of civic-political nationalism.

By contrast, Map 4 does so for ethno-natal nationalism, measuring how far each group is sympathetic to ethno-natal nationalism, i.e. how much they agree that to be truly British you

need to be white or be born here. Again, the higher up they are on this scale, the more likely they are to support some kind of ethno-natal nationalism.

Figure 3: How civic-political is this debate?




The civic-political nationalism scale is based on three items: (1) respect for the authority of Parliament; (2) commitment to democracy and freedom of speech; (3) obeying the law.³⁰ As with Map 2, each bubble in Maps 3 and 4 represents one group, with bubble size being proportional to the relative size of that group. The thick grey lines through the centre of the chart show the overall sample means. The thinner dotted line shows what would be the neutral position on each scale.

A number of things are worth noting from the comparison here. This map shows civic-political nationalism is broadly

neutral-to-positive across all five classes. Even those groups most hostile to the integration of Christianity and Britishness remain at least neutral about civic-political identity. In effect, there is relatively widespread endorsement of (or at least indifference to) parliamentary authority, democracy, freedom of speech and obeying the law, and even if the separatist groups are least enamoured of the civic-political dimension, it is not by much. In effect, **the debate is not really about the civic political dimension, around which there is – loosely speaking – a fair degree of consensus.**

It is worth comparing these data to the ethno-natal map.

Figure 4: How ethno-natal is this debate?



We need to be slightly careful with the measure on this map, because they comprise only two factors: (1) relationship between

Britishness and being White, and (2) the relationship between Britishness and having been born in Britain. That caveat noted, this map shows that ethno-natal nationalism differentiates the groups more sharply.

Unlike civic-political nationalism, the five groups are spread much more clearly across the scale. Committed Separatists are clearly lowest on this ethno-natal nationalism measure, but that is not the case for their fellow Separatists, who, like Values Integrationists, sit on the mean line here. As we might have expected from the description of the Cultural Separatists above, however much these two separatist groups agree on their desire to disentangle Christianity and Britishness, they feel somewhat differently about the kind of Britishness they are ‘defending’. By contrast, Belief Integrationists and especially Identity Integrationists are clearly higher on ethno-natal nationalism scale.

Perhaps the most significant element of this map, which is why we have included it alongside Map 3, is its contrast with the civic-political dimension of this debate. Some loose form of civic-political nationalism is relatively widespread across all groups, whereas ethno-natal nationalism is much more strongly associated with the divide between Separatist and Integrationist groups. In effect, although this debate isn’t about ethno-nationalism, it is the factor that is most divisive within the debate.

Moreover, it is worth noting that Maps 3 and 4 are not inverse of each other, i.e. it is not the case that the different groups hold *either* a civic-political understanding of Britishness or an ethno-natal one. Indeed, if anything the division is between those who, to some degree, hold both and those to hold neither.

This is a slight exaggeration as, as we have seen, most groups have some sympathy towards civic-political nationalism. However, it is striking that those who have a high view of civic-political Britishness also have a high view of ethno-natal Britishness *and* are the groups that most want to integrate Christianity with Britishness. By contrast, those groups who have lower views of civic-political Britishness and of ethno-natal Britishness are also separatists when it comes to Christianity-in-Britishness. In other words, **the debate around Christian nationalism looks like it is parasitic on the wider debate about national identity and loyalty.**

Map 5: How important is nationalism within the debate?

Alongside whether someone inclines more towards civic-political or ethno-natal types of nationalism, there is a wider question, touched on earlier in the report, about how inclined they are towards national identity at all. Do they see it as important? How ‘thick’ a concept of nationalism do they hold? This can be shown by calculating how inclined each group was at all to consider a(ny) characteristic of national identity important, whether it was ethnic, natal, cultural, political, economic, religious, geographical or ‘just’ emotional.

The following chart plots two different factors from those above:

- (on the x-axis) the average of each groups’ answers to the 12 statements asking about what is needed to make someone “truly British”. Those groups that show a smaller number here are less likely to say that factors are important to being truly British; in other words, they have a “thinner” form of nationalism. By contrast, those who show a larger number, tick more boxes when it comes to what is important about being British; they have a ‘thicker’ form of nationalism.
- (on the y-axis) the percentage within each group that agrees that “nationalism is a virus”. In other words, it is a measure of active hostility to nationalism.

Figure 5: How important is nationalism within the debate?



One would naturally expect that there would be some kind of correlation here, running from top-left to bottom-right: the thinner a nationalism you adhere to, the more likely you are to be actively hostile to nationalism. However, while we find this for three groups (Committed Separatists, Values Integrationists, Identity Integrationists), the trend is not very consistent, and reflects some of the differences between different groups:

- **Committed Separatists** are both noticeably hostile to nationalism and more indifferent to forms of national identity overall (recall, this isn't about Christian nationalism specifically, but nationalism in general.)
- Conversely, **Identity Integrationists** have the thickest attachment to national identity and are least likely to think that nationalism is a virus.

- **Values Integrationists** sit part way between these two positions, as they do for much else.

The other two groups do not conform to this pattern, however.

- **Cultural Separatists**, despite having so much in common with Committed Separatists when it comes to *Christian* nationalism, are closer to the other groups when it comes to nationalism *per se*. They don’t have a much thicker form of nationalism, but they are notably less concerned about nationalism being a problem. On the back of this, one might imagine that they would be prime fodder for nationalism, if there was something they cared or believed enough about their country.
- **Belief Integrationists**, by contrast, have almost as thick an attitude to national identity as Identity Integrationists, but are almost as worried about nationalism as Committed Separatists. This would suggest that they are closer to the category of patriotism than other groups, supportive of national identity but nervous about nationalism.

With these clarifications and distinctions in mind, we might want to characterise (or perhaps caricature) each of the five groups’ attitude to the nation in this way:

- **Committed Separatists** look, at heart, like internationalists, with a limited attachment to the nation.
- **Cultural Separatists** look like nationalists who are slightly ambivalent about the nation they want to protect.
- **Values Integrationists** look like generic patriots, largely untouched by the passions of this debate.
- **Identity Integrationists** look like Christians whose identity orients them to a kind of nationalism.

- **Belief Integrationists** look like Christians whose faith pushes them towards a form of patriotism rather than nationalism.

Conclusion

The five ‘maps’ we have shown in this chapter cast light on the debate around Christian nationalism from different angles. They show that there is a fundamental Christian dimension to this debate. There is a correlation between attitudes to Christianity, and the desired relationship between Christianity and Britishness. The more Christian you are, the more likely you are to want some form of integration, and at the extreme end, the more likely you are to support a position that could be called Christian nationalism.

However, a simple and straightforward correlation is complexified by a number of factors. Firstly, that correlation isn’t perfect. There are practising Christians within Committed Separatists, and non-religious people among Believing Integrationists, etc. Attitudes to Christianity and Britishness are not simply a function of people’s.

Second, while Christian belief does play a role in this, it does so in a complex way. Often what we are talking about is people’s identity or nominal attachment to Christianity, rather than their practice of the faith.

Third, for all that belief (or practice) does play a role in this debate, it seems subservient to culture. Concerns about identity, tradition, heritage, and culture appear to be in the driving seat here, more than belief systems. Christianity is entangled in this debate first and foremost because of its immense historic cultural importance to Britain, and only then, secondarily, on account of its dogma and theology.

Fourth, there is perhaps surprising (if by no means perfect) consensus between the groups in this debate on civic-political forms of nationalism, but rather less on ethno-natal concerns. Although the

whole debate isn’t simply about ethno-nationalism, it is a factor and arguably the most divisive one.

Finally, the whole debate is also parasitic on the wider debate about not simply what constitutes an acceptable form of nationalism (civic-political, ethno-natal, etc) but also the legitimacy and value of national loyalty in the first place. Those who are inclined away from that kind of national identity naturally reject any Christian form of it, while their ‘opponents’ are much happier with national identity and loyalty *per se*, as well as Christian forms of it.

In effect, the conversation about “Christian nationalism”, whether or not we like that term, takes its place and can only be understood in the context of a wider conversation about national identity and belonging.

6

3 How to talk about “Christian nationalism”

As we said at the outset, Christian nationalism is a contestable, unhelpful and possibly even meaningless term. It has strong American connotations, implies a coherence and unity that it presupposes rather than demonstrates, and obscures possible differences relating both to Christianity and nationhood. Yet it is the phrase that is currently in use, and for that reason if no other, we should start with it.

That does not mean continuing (let alone ending) with it, however. One of the main purposes of this report (and the wider Theos project of which it is a part) is to disambiguate and clarify the various different positions that the British public holds on the relationship between Christianity and nationality today. In doing so, we can join the conversation, bring some nuance to its assumptions and, in the process, steer it away from the narrow and sterile rhetoric of “them” vs “us”.

In the light of that, this final chapter works with the five groups that the research has identified and, picking up on the concerns and characteristics of each, puts forward a series of questions and perspectives that respectfully challenge that position. Put another way, the chapter outlines different ways of pursuing constructive conversations around the phenomenon that is commonly called “Christian nationalism”.

How to talk to Committed Separatists



Committed Separatists are the very antithesis of Christian nationalism in Britain and, as such, some will say, there is nothing to say to them. They have ‘got it right’. This, however, would be to fall into a simple dichotomy, which this whole report has tried to challenge. Simply because Committed Separatists do not fall prey to Christian nationalism, it doesn’t mean there are no problems with their views, still less that they form the default, sensible approach of all reasonable people.

Three topics, in particular, are worth exploring with this group. The first is the historical role of Christianity in British public and cultural life. However much they might want that to be separated in the future, the undeniable fact is that it has been an integral part of British life for centuries. What do Committed Separatists

think we should do about that? Denying it is dishonest. Worse, it is liable to breed resentment and give momentum to precisely those Integrationists whose views Separatists oppose. Paradoxical as it may sound, if a Committed Separatist is serious about wanting to fully disentangle Christianity from the nation (and state), he or she would be advised to have something positive and constructive to do with the nation’s considerable Christian history; some form of formal recognition and honouring that simultaneously is honest about how the nation came to be here, while allowing us (meaning the kind of ‘us’ the Committed Separatists want us to be) to develop a new future.

That last point – “the kind of ‘us’ the Committed Separatists want us to be” – leads on to a second point of challenge. Who do Committed Separatists think ‘we’ are? One of the striking things about the way these groups map together (as evidenced in Chapter 2) was how thin the ‘nationalism’ of Committed Separatists is. This group does not only reject all forms of Christian nationalism, but most forms of nationalism, and are oriented towards cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism, internationalism and globalism. In as far as they hold nationalistic sentiments, they crowd around civic and political criteria.

There is a genuine (and longstanding) question here about whether that is enough. The question is relevant in times of peace. Can high levels of taxation and redistribution, for example, be sustained without commensurate levels of national loyalty (sometimes known as The Progressive’s Dilemma)? But it is even more relevant in times of tension and conflict. Can you be an effective counterweight to nationalistically-inclined powers on the world stage with a weak or thin sense of your own national identity? To borrow Alasdair MacIntyre’s much referenced phrase, from a more analogue age,

defending one’s country with such a thin notion of what that nation is “would be like being asked to die for the telephone company”.³¹

The third point of challenge to this group is this. It is striking that although Committed Separatists don’t want Christianity as part of their national picture, they still see it as a welcoming and supportive influence when it comes to asylum, a topic about which they were notably ashamed of the UK’s response.³² That being so, it is likely that, in spite of wanting Christianity disentangled from notions of Britain and Britishness, Committed Separatists also see in Christian ethics, campaigning and public support a potential ally for causes that are close to their heart. They want, as it were, some of its fruit, even if they don’t want its roots entangled with the nation’s. This is not necessarily a straightforward balance to strike, and it is worth exploring with Committed Separatists how they think a nation that is scrubbed clean of Christianity would draw on Christian ethical, voluntary and community services to achieve the goods that Committed Separatists favour.

How to talk to Cultural Separatists



Despite being similar in many ways, the data outlined above make it clear that Cultural Separatists have different concerns to Committed Separatists. Their separatist ideas are more non-committal and rest more on cultural assumptions than they do on ideological commitments. As we remarked above, even though they don’t want Christianity to be part of their national picture, they are still hostile to the idea that any other cultural or religious identity should occupy that space.

That being so, engaging in the same kind of conversation with Cultural Separatists as with the Committed Separatists is unlikely to make much difference. Instead, three areas stand out as possible points of encounter, a set of concentric circles nestling within one another.

At the most focused level, it would be interesting to hear from Cultural Separatists why, given that they care so little about Christianity, they are so concerned at the prospect of a church becoming a mosque. Why should that bother them? What do they think they are preserving by keeping the church out of Muslim hands?

This question takes its place within a slightly wider one, pertaining to their understanding of the nation as a whole. What is that vision of the nation? On the one hand, they are generally proud of Britain’s “national history” and “national ceremonial occasions and symbols”. On the other, they are strongly antipathetic to asylum, immigration and Islam. This is a familiar trope among, say, Identity Integrationists (to whom we turn below). Unlike them, however, Cultural Separatists do not have any particular commitment to a Christian nation in which to welcome (or, more likely, from which to reject) people. What exactly is it that Cultural Separatists are proud of and want to protect from outside influence?

Finally, this (difficult) conversation is situated in a wider one, namely about Cultural Separatists’ lives. This group is more frustrated and disillusioned about their lives (and the state of the country) than Committed Separatists. They are more likely say that there is no or limited community around them and that they “feel lonely much of the time”, while being less likely to have a larger number of close friends or to agree that their local area is a place where people from different backgrounds get on well together. In the light of that, perhaps the most obvious place to start a conversation with Cultural Separatists about Christian nationalism, or nationalism, or indeed anything, is to understand better the reasons for that disaffection with their lives and their country.

How to talk to Values Integrationists



Conversations with Integrationists are, naturally, different to those with Separatists – but hopefully not so different. As outlined earlier, Values Integrationists are almost as concerned about Britain as are Cultural Separatists. Two things distinguish them here, though. First, they do not come at these concerns from a position of comparable disaffection, and second, they are far more likely to see these problems as connected to the decline of Christianity, and so to want Christianity to have some role to play in national affairs.

Two obvious conversation points spin off from this. First, why? Why do Values Integrationists favour some kind of ‘soft’ institutional ‘entanglement’ between Christianity and the British state, politics, law and culture. What exactly is it about Christianity that they see is

valuable for this role? And perhaps most significantly, given that such a high proportion of this group thinks that “holding Christian values” is central to being a Christian, where do they think those worthwhile Christian values come from?

If the first question is why, the second question is how. We noted above that there is a slight ambivalence about the extent and way in which Values Integrationists want to defend the relationship between Christianity and Britain. If it is unlikely, given their values-based emphasis, that they want Britain converted (in the way that Belief Integrationists might), how do they see Christian values as shaping British national life? What, indeed, are these Christian values?

How to talk to Identity Integrationists



In as far as any group merits the label that we have been trying to problematise through this report, i.e. “Christian nationalist”, it is the Identity Integrationists. In the light of that, this section might feel as if it were the paycheck moment of this research. How, at long last, can we talk productively with those who espouse Christian nationalist views?

As will be clear by now, it’s not as simple as that. In the first instance, this is a deeply anxious group, exhibiting more and stronger social concerns than any other group. In this respect, as with the Cultural Separatists, one line of conversation with this group will necessarily involve an attempt to understand and probe why they are so concerned. What is it that bothers them so much about the state of Britain today? How legitimate or well-grounded are those concerns?

Unlike the Cultural Separatists, the Identity Integrationists want to protect Britain’s Christianity as part of their defence, and this lends itself to a second area of conversation. In one regard, this conversation is strikingly similar to that with Values Integrationists. As that group can profitably be asked what, why, and how are the *values* of Christianity in Britain so important to defend, this group can be asked the same question about identity. Why is Britain’s Christian identity so important to protect, especially as, deeply committed to the identity of Christianity as this group are, that commitment doesn’t always translate into similarly high level of practice. Why is it so important to defend “our Christian heritage and culture” or make “sure our country stays Christian”, when such a (comparatively) small proportion of the group attends church?

This leads to a third, uncomfortable, line of conversation. Identity Integrationists, we have seen, are not just nationalists, but they are nationalists of every kind: civic/ political, natal, economic, cultural, and ethnic. Ultimately, however, it is their natal and ethnic forms of nationalism that stand out, with remarkably high levels of them agreeing that being white is important to being truly British, or that they are proud that Britain “is predominantly white”.

This is, to put it mildly, somewhat at odds with the Christianity they purport to want to defend. It cannot have escaped their attention that many of the most vigorous defenders of Christianity in Britain today are from minority ethnic communities. Is Identity Integrationists’ eagerness to defend Christian Britain, actually just white supremacy in a more palatable format? Does ‘Christianity’ really mean ‘White British’ to them? If so, an uncompromising conversation about the difference of Christianity and race, and the straightforward incompatibility of Christianity with racism, might be in order.

How to talk to Belief Integrationists



Belief Integrationists report high levels of Christian identity, but also of Christian belief and practice. In as far as any group wants Britain to be Christian in an orthodox/ living faith kind of a way, it is likely to be in this group. As remarked above, Belief Integrationists hold strong integrationist views because, for the most part, they want to promote Christianity rather than preserve it. If there is a group with whom to have a theologically informed conversation on these issues, it is probably this one.

If so, the more interesting conversations with this group are less likely to be about why they want Britain to be Christian – that is likely to be obvious from the bare fact of their religious beliefs – but by what means and in what way? Again, three areas invite consideration.

First, it is striking that a third of Belief Integrationists agree that “social problems today are ultimately down to feminism and erosion of traditional masculine values”. This gestures towards a generally more (theologically?) conservative view, and one that is worth exploring. Why is feminism such a threat? What do “traditional masculine values” actually mean? And what is the justification for, and risk of, this (theologically?) justified anti-feminism? And what role do (male?) Belief Integrationists envision for women in a Christian Britain?

Second, in a conversation akin to that with Identity Integrationists but arguably even more serious (given the greater theological engagement in this group), how is it that Belief Integrationists see Christianity as a Western religion, or are so amenable to the whiteness of Britain (recall 54% say they are proud that Britain “is predominantly white”)? Is this not completely inimical to the Christian beliefs that are supposedly fundamental to them?

Third, it is striking that this group is so inclined to support the idea of rule-breaking political “strong man” and even “necessary” political violence. Is this the case of being so keen on the ends, that you are prepared to countenance any means possible in achieving them? Or is it that this group feels so vexed by alternative (what they might consider morally evil or spiritually malign) social views, that they now feel it is time to ditch the inevitable compromises of democracy? Either way, there is a profitable conversation to be had here about political theology, and the importance of deliberation, compromise, representation, rights, and democracy within Christian thought.

One final conversation

There is one final conversation that might be worth pursuing with any of these groups, though with some more than others.

The so-called Great Replacement Theory was initially put forward by the French author Renaud Camus in the 1990s. It contends that the white population in Europe is being replaced by migrants from Muslim countries as part of an intentional programme of “replacist” elites. It has been dismissed by the vast majority of scholars, and is usually described as a paranoid fantasy popular among white supremacists.³³

As noted above, one of the questions we put to interviewees was how far they agreed with the statement “The white population in Europe is deliberately being replaced by migrants from Muslim countries.” The responses are given below. (Table 46)

Table 46: “The white population in Europe is deliberately being replaced by migrants from Muslim countries.” Strongly/ slightly agree (all groups and total sample)

	Strongly agree	Slightly agree
Committed Separatists	3%	7%
Cultural Separatists	15%	19%
Values Integrationists	16%	24%
Identity Integrationists	60%	22%
Belief Integrationists	33%	33%
Total Sample	18%	19%

With the exception of Committed Separatists, over a third of every group agrees with the Great Replacement Theory. In some cases, two thirds agree. More than eight in ten – 82% – of Identity

Integrationists agree. These are astonishingly high figures, and the way in which those groups that favour a closer relationship between Christianity and the British nation also are inclined to believe what is, in effect, a racist conspiracy theory is particularly alarming. Among the many conversations that the fascinating conjunction of Christianity, Britishness and nationalism provokes, this is surely one of the most important to pursue.

Conclusion

Not having any longitudinal data for the UK, it is hard to tell whether “Christian nationalism” is actually increasing. Anecdotally it seems to be and coverage of it certainly is. That being so, it is important to interrogate the movement as carefully as possible.

As this report has argued and demonstrated, however, “Christian nationalism” is not really a cohesive movement but part of a shifting landscape of different attitudes to the right relationship between Christianity (and religion more general) and national identity. Each of those phenomena – Christianity and nationalism – take different forms, which means that there is a variety of different positions that people adopt here, whether “separatist” or “integrationist”.

Some of these positions, most obviously what we have here termed “Identity Integrationists” seem to merit the label “Christian nationalist” and that being so, many will take succour from the fact that this is the smallest group in the overall population.

However, it would be a mistake simply to divide the world into a (minority) them and (majority) us, and leave it at that. The relationship between religious and national identity is fluid, complex and often fraught, in which everyone has a position to defend, no matter where they stand. In what feels like an increasingly tense and angry conversation, it is important at least to try and understand the real range and nature of the views held by different parties, so we can speak to what they are rather than what we want them to be. It is our hope that this is what this report has done.



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Appendix A: Demographic and socio-economic profile of all groups

	Total	Committed Separatists	Cultural Separatists	Values Integrationists	Identity Integrationists	Belief Integrationists
Male	49%	46%	46%	51%	51%	53%
Female	51%	53%	53%	49%	49%	47%
Age						
Gen Z (18-29 years old)	17%	23%	14%	17%	4%	19%
Millennials (aged 30-45)	27%	29%	32%	22%	18%	32%
Gen X (aged 46-61)	29%	27%	30%	30%	36%	24%
Baby Boomers (aged 62 - 80) / Silent Gen (81+)	27%	21%	23%	31%	42%	25%
Class						
ABC134	55%	59%	52%	56%	50%	52%
C2DE35	45%	41%	48%	44%	50%	48%
Income						
High	23%	23%	26%	22%	23%	19%
Mid	32%	30%	30%	34%	33%	33%
Low	41%	39%	39%	42%	40%	46%
Ethnicity ³⁶						
White	86%	85%	89%	87%	93%	80%
Non-white	13%	13%	10%	12%	7%	20%
Education						
High	38%	41%	34%	37%	33%	42%
Mid	35%	36%	35%	36%	40%	30%
Low	25%	22%	31%	27%	26%	26%
Work Status						
Working full time (30 or more hours per week)	45%	47%	46%	41%	38%	50%
Working part time (8-29 hours per week)	15%	13%	17%	16%	14%	17%

	Total	Committed Separatists	Cultural Separatists	Values Integrationists	Identity Integrationists	Belief Integrationists
Working part time (Less than 8 hours per week)	2%	2%	3%	2%	2%	1%
Full time student	2%	3%	1%	2%	–	2%
Home maker / stay-at home parent	4%	5%	4%	6%	3%	2%
Retired	21%	17%	18%	24%	31%	20%
Unemployed	5%	7%	5%	3%	3%	4%
Unable to work because of illness/ disability/ injury	5%	5%	5%	4%	7%	3%
Not working	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	0
Urban/ Rural						
Urban (e.g. city or large town)	29%	31%	30%	27%	19%	34%
Suburban (e.g. residential area on the edge of a city or town)	53%	52%	50%	56%	59%	48%
Rural (e.g. village, hamlet or countryside)	18%	16%	20%	17%	22%	18%



Endnotes

Executive Summary

- 1 “Believing” indicates belief in God, that Jesus was the Son of God, and other articles of Christian faith. “Practising” indicates church attendance, prayer, Bible-reading, etc. “Ethical” indicates an appreciation of, and intention to live by, Christian ethical norms. “Identitarian” indicates identifying with the label Christian as a way of distinguishing oneself from those who do not. “Nominal” indicates a willingness to call oneself Christian but without any of the above associations.
- 2 Details on these different kinds of nationalism can be found here: Nick Spencer, ‘Brexit 10 years on: What does it mean to be British today?’; Brexit 10 years on: What does it mean to be British today? – Theos Think Tank – Understanding faith. Enriching society.
- 3 C2DE refers to social groups C2 (Skilled manual workers), D (Semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers) and E (State pensioners, casual and lowest grade workers, unemployed with state benefits only).

Introduction

- 4 For just a tiny handful of these discussions, see The hard right is claiming the cross – and true Christians should not allow it | Polly Toynbee | The Guardian; As a Reverend, I cannot ignore the Christian nationalism in the January 6 attack | The Independent; Christian nationalism threatens democracy. Secularism protects it. | National Secular Society
- 5 Rising Christian nationalism: a threat to us all – Humanists UK
- 6 Luke Bretherton, “On why NOT to use the term Christian nationalism”, Taken from the BISHOPS’ WORKING GROUP ON “PROMOTING UNITY IN OUR NATION”
- 7 Christian Nationalism: an explainer – Theos Think Tank – Understanding faith. Enriching society.
- 8 How big is Christian Nationalism in the UK? – Theos Think Tank – Understanding faith. Enriching society.
- 9 Whitehead, Andrew L., and Samuel L. Perry. *Taking America Back for God: Christian Nationalism in the United States*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2020
- 10 This item was reverse-coded in analysis, i.e. a low score was treated high indication of Christian nationalism, and vice versa.
- 11 Storm, Ingrid. “Ethnic Nominalism and Civic Religiosity: Christianity and National Identity in Britain.” *The Sociological Review* 59, no. 4 (2011): 828–846. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-954X.2011.02040.x>
- 12 As was sometimes the case in the nineteenth century. See McLeod, Hugh. “Christianity and Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century Europe.” *International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church* 15, no. 1 (2015): 7–22. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1474225X.2015.1020009>.

- 13 As was the case, for example, in post-Reformation England, war time Britain, and is still very much the case in parts of America and Russia today.
- 14 Further analysis showed that these forms of nationalism are also positively associated with other religious variables such as belief in God, importance of religion in daily life and prayer frequency.
- 15 Storm, “Ethnic Nominalism”, p. 841.
- 16 Storm, “Ethnic Nominalism”, p. 837.

2. How do these groups relate to one another?

- 17 It is worth noting that of the remaining 24% who did not disagree that “It is important for the political leader of my country to be a Christian”, 18% answered “neither agree nor disagree”, 5% said “don’t know”, and 1% said “prefer not to say”. The fact that the majority of a group answers one way (e.g. disagrees) does not mean that the rest answers the other way (e.g. agrees).
- 18 Our national history; Our national culture, e.g. music, art and literature; National ceremonial occasions and symbols, e.g. national anthem and flag; National sporting events and teams; Our political values; Our countryside; Our commitment to international law and institutions; The way we treat immigrants and asylum seekers; The fact that my country is predominantly white; The way we treat vulnerable people (e.g. poor, sick, unemployed); The way we treat people from ethnic and religious minority groups; Our commitment to human rights
- 19 “Believing that Jesus was the Son of God”; “Trying to follow Jesus in your life”; “Holding Christian values”; “Defending our Christian heritage and culture”; “Being an active member of a church”; “Being baptised / christened”; “Reading the Bible regularly”; “Praying regularly”; “Following the teachings of the Church”; “Trying to make sure our country stays Christian”
- 20 There might be a touch of idealism, or at least a bit of inconsistency, here because Identity Integrationists also have the smallest circle of close friends and is also almost as unlikely as Cultural Separatists to say “There is a strong local community, and I am connected and participate” (14% vs 12%). Whatever the truth is here, however, Identity Integrationists are clearly not smouldering with anger on account of their personal circumstances.
- 21 For example, 79% of Identity Integrationists agreed that “We have become too obsessed with human rights” compared with 45% of the total sample, and 20% of Committed Separatists.
- 22 These were: contributing economically, respecting the authority of parliament, being able to speak English, sharing national customs and traditions, being committed to democracy and freedom of speech, defending the country when people criticise it, obeying the law, being proud of Britain, and living here).
- 23 NB We have excluded the relatively small number of religious respondents who affiliate to a religion other than Christianity in each group, for the sake of clarity
- 24 To be more precise: The Christian Britishness scale was constructed from seven items. (1) To be truly British you should be a Christian. (2) People who do not hold Christian values do not

- belong in Britain. (3) The government should formally state that Britain is a Christian country. (4) Religious education in Britain should prioritise the teaching of Christianity. (5) The law in Britain should be based on Christian values. (6) It is important for the political leader of my country to be a Christian. (7) How happy or unhappy respondents would be if the local church closes and is turned into a mosque. The first six items were recoded so that higher values consistently indicate stronger sympathy. The final item was coded reversely and was coded in the same substantive direction, so that greater unhappiness about a local church becoming a mosque contributes to a higher Christian Britishness score. “Don’t know” responses were coded to the midpoint, while “Prefer not to answer” was treated as missing. The recoded items were then combined into a standardized index and rescaled around a neutral midpoint, allowing the vertical axis to run from lowest to highest Christianity & Britishness scores.
- 25 The full five questions that made up the Christianity dimension in this chart (y-axis) were: do they think that “believing that Jesus was the Son of God”, “trying to follow Jesus in one’s life”, “being an active member of a church”, “following the teachings of the Church”, and “praying regularly” are important for being a Christian.
- 26 The four elements that go into making the cultural dimension on the y-axis are whether people think “sharing national customs and traditions”, “defending the country when people criticise it”, and “being proud of Britain” are central to being “truly” British, and whether they see “the defence of Christian heritage and culture as important to being Christian”.
- 27 To generate this chart, we converted both additive scales (ideological and cultural) onto the same -10 to +10 metric, with the midpoint representing the centre of the theoretical scale.
- 28 This would, of course, simply be another bubble on the chart, at the point the grey lines intersect, but it drawn as two lines here in order to help comparison with the five groups positions.
- 29 Brexit 10 years on: What does it mean to be British today? - Theos Think Tank - Understanding faith. Enriching society.
- 30 For this scale, and the following ethno-nationalism one, the component items were recoded so that higher values consistently indicate stronger endorsement of the relevant form of nationalism. Like all previous items, these scales were also rescaled onto a common -10 to +10 scale, with 0 representing the theoretical neutral point. In the first chart, the x-axis is Civic-political nationalism; in the second, it is Ethno-natal nationalism. The y-axis in both charts is Christianity & Britishness.
- 32 See From Strangers to Neighbours: The Church and the Integration of Refugees - Theos Think Tank - Understanding faith. Enriching society.
- 33 For a discussion of the popularity of the Great Replacement Theory, see Mark Sedgwick (2024) ‘The great replacement narrative: fear, anxiety and loathing across the West’, *Politics, Religion & Ideology*, 25:4, 548-562. For a detailed demographic analysis of the claims made in the Great Replacement Theory (without actually being a formal rebuttal), see: Conrad Hackett et al (2019). ‘Projections of Europe’s Growing Muslim Population Under Three Migration Scenarios’ *Journal of Religion and Demography*, 6(1), 87-122. <https://doi.org/10.1163/2589742X-00601002>

Appendix A: Demographic and socio-economic profile of all groups

- 34 ABC1 is a composite that refers to social groups A (Higher managerial, administrative, or professional occupations), B (Intermediate managerial, administrative, or professional roles) and C1 (Supervisory, clerical, or junior managerial, administrative, or professional positions).
- 35 C2DE refers to social groups C2 (Skilled manual workers), D (Semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers) and E (State pensioners, casual and lowest grade workers, unemployed with state benefits only).
- 36 “White” here is a composite measure of the categories “English/Welsh/Scottish/Northern Irish/British”, “Irish”; “Gypsy or Irish Traveller”, and “any other White background”. “Non-white” is a composite of “White and Black Caribbean”, “White and Black African”, “White and Asian”, “Any other Mixed/Multiple ethnic background”, “Indian”, “Pakistani”, “Bangladeshi”, “Chinese”, “Any other Asian background, please describe”, “African”, “Caribbean”, “Any other Black/African/Caribbean background, please describe”, and “Arab”. Discrepancies are because of the option “Prefer not to say.”

3. How to talk about “Christian nationalism”

- 31 This version of the quote (there are various versions cited on-line) comes from MacIntyre’s essay ‘Poetry as political philosophy: notes on Burke and Yeats’, published in his book *Ethics and Politics: Selected Essays* (Cambridge University Press; 2006). The full quote (p. 163) reads, “The citizen of the modern state is thus invited to view the state intellectually in one way, as a self-interested calculator, but imaginatively in quite another. The modern state presented only in the former light could never inspire adequate devotion. Being asked to die for it would be like being asked to die for the telephone company.”

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Beyond “Christian nationalism”

Is Britain developing a “Christian nationalist” movement? What, indeed, is “Christian nationalism”? The phrase is familiar from US politics, and increasingly used in the UK, but often deployed vaguely and polemically.

This new report, from the think tank Theos, offers the first sustained and detailed analysis of what is happening with “Christian nationalism” in the UK, with further studies on France, Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Romania to follow.

It pulls apart different attitudes to Christianity (belief, practice, values, identity, etc.) and to nationalism (civic/ political, cultural, ethnic, etc.) and uses them to identify five major groups within the UK population that differ according to their opinions on the appropriate relationship between ‘Christianity’ and ‘Britishness’.

One of these can credibly be described as “Christian nationalist” but, as the report argues, the whole debate must be understood, not as a straightforward import of American culture-war politics, but within the context of changing British attitudes to Christianity and to the nation today.

“

Dr Nick Spencer is Senior Fellow at Theos, and the author of a number of books and Theos reports on religion, politics and public life.

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