What lies behind France’s latest wave of unrest? Hannah Rich draws on Theos/RED C polling to explore how different generations understand political violence, economic insecurity and the state. 23/10/2026
Two viral images of modern France emerged from the ashes of the recent rioting and violent disorder across the country. The first, of a couple calmly enjoying a drink and a cigarette against the backdrop of a burning city. The second, of a person in a Pink Panther costume running away from a police water cannon, under a street sign for Bastille, the Parisian fortress whose storming famously heralded the French Revolution. If the latter felt a little too on the nose, too much of a caricature even for France, this was because it turned out to be an AI fake, albeit not so ludicrous as to be instantly identifiable as such. In the post–mortem analysis of the riots too, fact and fiction have blurred convincingly. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the widespread scenes of violence in French cities in recent weeks have been seized upon by all manner of political actors to prove their own point and scapegoat different groups accordingly: the young, the migrant, the working class, the disenfranchised, but also political extremists and the government itself.
As part of our ongoing research into Christianity and nationhood across Europe, we polled the French population’s attitudes to a range of topics including politics, authority, national identity, and religion.[1] The polling was conducted in April 2026 and surveyed 1,873 adults, whereas the majority of recent protest participants were lycéens or sixth formers. The data cannot therefore tell us directly why people have taken to the streets – but they do offer a data–driven picture of France and her approach here, as a counterpoint or nuance to some of the prevailing narratives around this recent violence.
Firstly, with regards to protest itself. It is often suggested that protest is the national religion of the French, and our data bear that out to some extent. Across all countries we polled – the UK, Hungary, Poland, Germany, Romania and France – the French are the least likely to agree that the extreme protest groups named in the question should be banned,[2] with only 19% of French respondents agreeing with this statement, compared to 39% of UK respondents and 29% across all six countries polled. They are also the most likely to strongly disagree with a ban on certain protest groups (25%, compared with 6% of Polish respondents and 16% across the whole sample).
Within the French sample, Gen Z (18–29 year olds) are more likely than their older compatriots to agree that political violence is sometimes necessary; 17% of the youngest cohort agree, compared with 16% of Millennials, 12% of Gen X and just 6% of Baby Boomers. We observe the same pattern to varying extents across other countries in the sample; across the board, Gen Z are the most willing to regard political violence as justifiable in certain circumstances, although the French cohort appears uniquely likely to translate this into actual political demonstrations or unrest.
These generations differ with respect to whether the current moment requires ‘strongman’ political leaders who are sometimes willing to break the rules. Gen Z are seen more as the exception here, with 32% agreeing compared to 37% of Millennials, 38% of Gen X and 40% of Baby Boomers. This indicates that younger French adults are more willing to countenance political violence than older generations, but less likely to endorse ‘strongman’ leaders who break political rules. Here, we might suggest they differentiate between collective or grassroots demonstrations of violence and those of authority figures.
However, perhaps more strikingly, the French as a whole are also the most likely national group in our sample to agree with the need for ‘strongman’ leadership; 37% agree compared to 17% of Hungarians, although 36% of UK participants also agree.
There is a longstanding tension in French political life between the considerable authority invested in the central state and a tradition of popular mobilisation against that same authority. The polling data do not give us causation, but we might hypothesise that the current violence is both an expression of considerable dissatisfaction with political authority coexisting with a desire for more decisive, even ‘strongman’, forms of leadership in the run up to next year’s national elections. This hints at a wider crisis of political trust and legitimacy.
In terms of the motivation for discontent, the initial catalyst for the current disorder was French lycéens – sixth form or college–age students – protesting in response to the deteriorating standard and resourcing of the French education system. However, this has broadened to reflect wider discontent with the cost of living in France and the decaying social fabric of the country and the government’s handling of the country’s economic difficulties.
It is important here to highlight some of the nuances within the groups responsible for recent protests and violence. The wider protest movement encompasses a diversity of groups and individuals, including students, teachers, trade unionists, parents and other demonstrators, most of whom protested peacefully, or at the very least began in that spirit. What began as valid grievances and peaceful demonstrations has descended into vandalism and looting, but this is not representative of all those protesting: the fact that nearly 2,000 people have been arrested for rioting across France is shocking, but estimates suggest many, many more – over half a million – protested, most of them non–violently.
Our research asked interviewees to indicate how concerned they are about 23 different ‘big issues’. Across all six countries in the sample, ‘the cost of living’ was the topic about which most people were concerned. In France, the most concerning three issues were the cost of living; crime, law and order; and public finances and debt. These were held in common with the UK, Germany and Poland, which all shared the same top three issues.
We find that younger French people are more likely to be very concerned about the cost of living today, although net levels of concern do not diverge significantly between generations: 54% of French Gen Z respondents expressed concern here, compared to 42% of Baby Boomers. Conversely, older generations are the most likely age groups to be concerned about public finances and debt. Among France’s Baby Boomers, 97% say they are concerned about this and 49% are very concerned, with concern decreasing progressively with each younger generation, to 83% of Gen Z (26% very concerned). Gen Z are the most likely to be either slightly or not at all concerned about public finances and debt, despite their stronger concern for the cost of living.
We might suggest this is because younger adults perceive public finances as distinct from their concern for individual or personal finances and the cost of living, the latter of which is a stronger driver of dissatisfaction. This is particularly significant in France, where demands for better–funded public services collide with an increasingly constrained fiscal position.
No one takes to the streets or burns things down explicitly because GDP or national debt is less healthy than it might be, but they might well be driven to do so because of a growing sense of insecurity around their personal or household financial circumstances and those of their entire generation collectively. Perhaps surprisingly, we observe minimal generational difference in concern about economic inequality or the gap between the elites and normal people.
Despite their differing economic priorities, these anxieties appear to be shared across generations. The tension within the French context is thus not simply between different generations, but between what citizens expect the state to provide and what it can sustainably afford. The demands of each group may be different, as are their reactions, but in their own way all are experiencing the inability of the French state to meet their demands because of the deteriorating economic position.
We find that older generations display higher levels of concern around levels of immigration, the integration of migrants, the number of Muslims and the number of asylum seekers; indeed, these are the three issues where we observe the biggest gap in levels of concern between the youngest and older generations in France. Gen Z and Millennials are much less exercised about these topics. In France, 21% of Gen Z are concerned about the numbers of Muslims, compared with 36% of Millennials and 55% of Baby Boomers. On the number of asylum seekers, 31% of Gen Z are concerned, less than half the proportion of Baby Boomers (64%) here. Regarding immigration levels in general, 37% of Gen Z, 51% of Millennials and 65% of Baby Boomers are concerned.
As next year’s French elections draw closer, competing interpretations and responses to the country’s social and economic malaise will abound. Inevitably, the truth is closer to a complex web of different causes and motivations which both intersect and diverge according to generational priorities. There is one national crisis, and a common understanding that this is the genesis of the current protests, yet the crisis is understood in almost as many ways as there are French citizens, or at least generations, and this points towards an increasingly strained relationship between French society and the institutions intended to serve it.
This article is part of a wider programme of research into the relationship between Christianity and nationhood in Europe. A research report into the relationship between Christianity and French national identity will be published in early 2027, along with other similar reports on Germany, Hungary, Poland and Romania. Our UK report can be found here.
